National Territorial
Command
Nationaal
Territoriaal Commando (NTC)
Part
I | Part II |
Part III | Operational Role |
National Reserve
Corps
| Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Staff
and Staff Company
National Territorial Command |
Gouda |
56/48/26/138
(268)
|
113/88/219/102
(522) |
Notes
| a. |
On mobilisation
Northern Regional Military Command, encompassing the
Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe
provinces in peacetime, would
become Drenthe Provincial Military
Command/Garrison Command.1 |
Part
I | Part II
| Part III | Operational Role | National Reserve Corps
| Unit |
Main
Equipment |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War Strength |
| 323 Security
Infantry Battalion [a] |
|
– |
– |
44/126/680/2
(852) |
| 327 Security
Infantry Battalion [b] |
|
– |
– |
38/113/720/2
(873) |
| 101 Quadruple
Anti-Aircraft Machinegun Platoon [d] |
M55
Quad |
– |
– |
1/17/69
(87) |
| 102 Quadruple
Anti-Aircraft Machinegun Platoon [d] |
M55
Quad |
– |
– |
1/17/69
(87) |
| 103 Quadruple
Anti-Aircraft Machinegun Platoon [d] |
M55
Quad |
– |
– |
1/17/69
(87) |
Notes
| a. |
On NATO Simple Alert
under operational control of Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT) and earmarked to
secure Headquarters Allied
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT),2
which had its wartime location
in a hill in the Eifel.3 Filled
by mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period in
11
Armoured Infantry Battalion up to eight and a half years
prior to mobilisation.4 |
| b. |
Earmarked
to secure Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam.2 Filled
by mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period in
41
Armoured Infantry Battalion up to eight and a half
years prior to mobilisation.4 |
| c. |
The
operational role of 305 Commando Battalion was to provide military
assistance, in particular in keeping open the lines of
communications (LOCs); to locate, bind and neutralise enemy
reconnaissance and sabotage units; and to serve as a mobile
general reserve for National Territorial Commander. Missions
might include direct action (DA)
against
enemy airborne or seaborne elements and securing,
destroying or retaking vital objects. On mobilisation the
battalion would be deployed in the west of the country, as the
most important
objects were located there; initially it would disperse over
several locations to enable a quick first response. The
battalion was filled
by Commando Corps cadre and mobilisable personnel that had fulfilled
their active-duty period in
104
Observation and Reconnaissance Company up to eight and a half
years prior to mobilisation. The 'classic' commando
role was partly covered by their
training
with 104 Company and partly by a four-week refresher training prior to
their
assignment to the battalion.4
5 |
| d |
Filled
by personnel from the
general pool of mobilisable
reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation,4 after a
refresher/instruction training as their had been no active-duty units
of this type since 1978.
These three platoons formed the entire anti-aircraft capability
available to National Territorial Commander. In wartime their
initial mission would be to protect the west-east supply lines in the
IJssel-Maas area and to counter any enemy airborne operations there.
They might also be placed under command of the infantry brigades or
other territorial subcommands, as needed.6 |
Part
I | Part II | Part III | Operational Role | National Reserve Corps
| Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
| 301 Service
Support Command [a] |
Teuge |
12/98/2/446
(558) |
7/43/6/153
(209) |
| 302 Service
Support Command [a] |
Breda |
15/139/2/575
(731) |
11/64/5/303
(383) |
| 303 Service
Support Command [a] |
Gouda |
9/96/2/360
(467) |
6/32/5/162
(205) |
| Refresher
Training Command [b] |
Ossendrecht |
12/28/64/22
(126) |
– |
| Royal
Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command [c] |
Culemborg |
6/39/8/10
(63) |
4/33/8/10
(55) |
| 402
Map Storage and Distribution Group [d] |
De
Bilt |
-/3/4/3
(10) |
-/3/6/3
(12) |
| POMS Management
[e] |
| Staff |
Coevorden |
-/-/-/65
(65) |
? |
| Site
Brunssum |
Brunssum |
? |
? |
| Site
Coevorden |
Coevorden |
? |
? |
| Site Eygelshoven |
Eygelshoven |
? |
? |
| Site
Ter Apel |
Ter
Apel |
? |
? |
| Site
Vriezenveen |
Vriezenveen |
? |
? |
| Royal
Military Band |
Den
Haag |
3/68/24/1
(96) |
3/68/24/1
(96) |
| National
Territorial Command Peace Strength: 379/1647/2545/5465 (10036)13 |
| National
Territorial Command War Strength: 2423/6071/31184/3211 (42889)13 |
Notes
| a. |
The
three service support commands were responsible for control
and
management, including first and second echelon maintenance, of materiel
stored in mobilisation complexes and other facilities. Each of the
three commands operated five to six control and management regions.7 |
| b. |
On
average Refresher Training Command called up fifty-four companies each
year, which amounted to ± eight thousand reservists.
In general refresher training lasted three to four weeks for
combat units and about two weeks for some of the support units.
Restrictions in budget, equipment and the availability of professional
cadre meant that field training, conducted up to battalion level, was
often limited and dependent on improvisation. There
was not
enough capacity to call up every mobilisable unit every six
years
as was originally intended, so choices had to be made. The emphasis was
on mobilisable staffs and staff companies, which often joined command
post exercises (CPX) of 1 (NL)
Corps formations.8 |
| c. |
In the late 1980s the
Royal Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command
(EOCKL) each year disposed of some 10,000 shells, 250 missiles, 30,000
bullets, 200
bombs and five V1 rockets remaining from World War II.9
In wartime EOCKL was expected to be confronted with explosives
deployed by enemy special forces teams (Spetsnaz) aiming to sabotage
the Lines of Communications or to eliminate key civilian or military
leaders.
In the early 1980s exercises proved that EOCKL's wartime organisation
was much too small for this role, but budgetary
constraints meant
that no substantial improvements were made.10 |
| d. |
Under
functional command of Commander-in-Chief
of the Army. Stored and distributed
military maps for the armed forces, the central organisation of the Ministry
of Defence, and NATO partners. Distribution
to 1 (NL)
Corps
was handled by 401 Map
Distribution Platoon.11 |
| e. |
The
five Pre-positioned
Organizational Materiel
Storage
(POMS) sites on Netherlands territory contained the materiel of one and
one third US Army armored division (Division Set) as part of the POMCUS
concept (Preposition
of Materiel
Configured in Unit Sets);
see NATO Commands, Northern
Army Group.
Peacetime management was executed by a Dutch civilian staff, which
appears to have been unusual within the POMCUS concept. Dutch
management and personnel at the sites were responsible for
storage, maintenance and user-readiness of materiel; all in all ±
fourteen
hundred Dutch civilian personnel were employed. In addition there were
± twenty US Army personnel at each site, probably from US Army Combat
Equipment Group Europe (CEGE) under whose administrative
control the sites fell. It would appear that
the sites held materiel of 1 (US) Cavalry Division and 5 (US)
Infantry Division (Mechanized).12
13 |
Operational Role
14
National
Territorial Command was charged with the preparation and execution of
the following tasks:
- Territorial
security of the Netherlands. In peacetime this was restricted to
securing Royal
Army
property and installations. On mobilisation National Territorial
Command
would mobilise two infantry brigades, three security
infantry battalions, one commando battalion and
forty-six security
infantry companies, in addition to eight active-duty
security infantry companies and one hundred and
forty-three
platoons of the National Reserve Corps
(NATRES)
that would be
available on short notice to safeguard the mobilisation and to carry
out
subsequent security-related missions. Twenty provisional security
platoons would also be available on short notice to secure the
mobilisation process. National Territorial Commander
retained overall responsibility but local implementation was
generally delegated to the Provincial Military
Commanders/Garrison
Commanders who were initially responsible for mobilisation
preparations, security missions, and the recruitment and training of
NATRES units under their command. (See Part I
and II)
- Mobilisation
of the Royal Army (ordered by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army).
Given the fact that nearly seventy percent of the Royal Army's wartime
personnel strength was mobilisable this task was as complicated as it
was vital for the Dutch contribution to NATO's Central Front. National Territorial
Command handled or
facilitated mobilisation-related
matters such as the assignment of personnel through its intricate unit
filling and reserve system; logistical
support, including the maintenance and security of
fifty-one
mobilisation
complexes, some ten other storage complexes, and the materiel
therein; and refresher training
courses conducted under the auspices of Refresher Training Command.
(See
Part III)
- Logistical
support for the Royal Army and for NATO reinforcements in the
Netherlands
(Host Nation Support). After France left the NATO integrated military
structure in 1966 the Communications Zone
of Northern
Army Group (NORTHAG) had
in effect been reduced to the Netherlands, Belgium
and
Luxembourg, which
made Host Nation Support and keeping open the Lines of Communications
in these countries vital for the sustainment of the Central Front.
National Territorial Command maintained five US Army Pre-positioned
Organizational Materiel
Storage
(POMS) sites in
the Netherlands. (See Part II
and III)
- Road
transport and military traffic control within the Netherlands, also for
NATO reinforcements (Host Nation Support). (See Part II)
- Coordination
of civil-military activities; including preparations for and
implementation of Martial Law (Staat van Beleg) insofar not exercised
by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; coordination between civil and
military
authorities at national, provincial and local levels; cooperation with
(semi-)governmental agencies and institutions such as the National
Railways (Nederlandse Spoorwegen), the national postal, telegraph, and
telephone service (PTT), Rijkswaterstaat, electricity
companies, et cetera;
requisitioning
of civilian vehicles
by pre-arranged agreements; providing military
assistance to civilian communities, and refugee settlement.
- Explosive
ordnance disposal. (See
Part III)
- Other
administrative tasks relating to billeting, training areas and firing
ranges. <
National Reserve Corps
15
The
National Reserve Corps (Korps Nationale Reserve), or National Reserve
(NATRES) for short, was a
home guard force composed of part-time volunteer reservists, all of
whom had seen military service but did not occupy functions
in regular mobilisable units.16
Prior to, during and after
mobilisation NATRES
units would guard important objects and secure
relatively small areas in their locality. Potentially the most
crucial part of their mission was safeguarding the
mobilisation itself, for apart from the eight active-duty security
infantry companies they were, in the first delicate
stages, the
only security force available. The
volunteer reservists would
be called up in the warning phase preceding actual
mobilisation (likely: NATO Military Vigilance), and with
their personal equipment and weapons kept at
home they were able to deploy to their designated locations
within
a few hours. In the first stages there were more than three hundred
objects that would need to be secured immediately: mobilisation
complexes,
mobilisation bureaus, command
posts, ammunition storage complexes, telecommunication centres, rail
yards, wharfs,
and vulnerable points in the roads and railroads required for the
deployment of 1 (NL)
Corps to West
Germany.
Training was limited,
mostly due to budgetary constraints, but also because of inefficiencies
in the training programme. Though
morale and efforts were generally high, NATRES officers in 1986
concluded that
operational readiness was, all in all, questionable.
Volunteer
reservists were obliged to participate in training and field exercises
between fifty and one hundred hours per year. In addition there was a
mandatory five-day exercise every four years. Twice a year there was a
(non-mandatory) twenty-five-hour exercise, and company
staffs were expected to exercise at least that often. During these and
other exercises NATRES units generally performed well
in relatively simple security missions. The platoons
were
supposed to be able to handle more complex missions such as
company-level operations and area security, but operational plans
primarily assigned them
to static guard and object-security duties, with area security and
mobile-reserve missions mostly left to the regulars of the
(mobilisable) security infantry companies.17
Because
of the voluntary
nature of NATRES, units were often understrength. The personnel
strengths given on this website are merely authorised strengths. In
1981 there was
a general shortage of 15.4 percent, but the lack of reserve officers
was much more serious: 34 percent. In 1984 this shortage had risen
to no less than 41 percent: after a successful
recruitment campaign twenty-two new platoons and nineteen
company
staffs were formed between 1983 and 1988, but finding able
platoon
and (deputy) company commanders remained problematic. The National
Reserve
Corps was allowed to grow, but mainly because it was a low cost/no
cost way
to beef up territorial security, which was deemed necessary
because of the (perceived) threat of enemy interdiction and sabotage
actions (e.g. Spetsnaz). In 1988 the overall strength of NATRES was about 4.500 men.18
<
National Territorial Command:
subcommands and major units, 1985
_________________________________________________
| 1. |
|
NIMH 430, inv. nr. 54
(Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985), Blad K. Hoffenaar en
Schoenmaker, Met de blik,
299, 301. |
| 2. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1248, Realisatie NTC d.d. 20 januari 1975. See also
De Jong en Hoffenaar, Op
herhaling, 87 and Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op.
cit., 324,
326.
|
| 3. |
|
Felius,
Einde
Oefening, 210. In peacetime Headquarters
AFCENT was
located in Brunssum. Ibid. |
| 4. |
|
NIMH
205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 27
mei 1980. Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983. |
| 5. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1371 (reorganisatie 305 Commandotroepenbataljon,
1975-1976). Felius, Einde Oefening, 208.
Krijger
en Elands, Commandotroepen, 72, 102.
Line of communications: "A route, either land, water, and/or air, which
connects an operating military force with a base of operations and
along which supplies and military forces move." US
Department of Defense Dictionary, 253. Direct action:
"Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by
special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or
inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel." Ibid., 130. |
| 6. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1383,
Opname pelsvm in slo NTC d.d. 10 januari 1978. Ibid., Memo Realisatie
Legerplannen nr 76B mobstellen 101 Pelvm d.d. 13 februari 1978. |
| 7. |
|
VS
17-146, A-6-4. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 300. Van den Heuvel
et al., De
beheersregio. Wattel, Materiële
mobilisatievoorbereiding. |
| 8. |
|
De Jong
en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 98-102, 122-125. The August/September 1986
issue if the semi-official army magazine Legerkoerier
includes a refresher training calendar for 1987 with planned training
periods specified per unit. |
| 9. |
|
Sorrell, Je
maintiendrai, 47. |
| 10. |
|
Van
Woensel, Vrij van
explosieven, 191-193. |
| 11. |
|
De Rooij,
402 Laat zich,
14-15. Under functional command (onder functioneel bevel): a separate command
relationship giving a commander or functionary a task-specific
authority over a unit not under his command. VS 2-7200, 24. |
| 12. |
|
Bremer, Nationaal Territoriaal Commandant,
16-17. Website POMS Nederland Medical. Website
U.S. Army in Germany, Combat Equipment Group Europe. The
US Army divisions are named in: website relikte.com, Die POMCUS-Depots in Nachbarschaft zu
Niedersachsen (thanks to Jo van der Pluijm). |
| 13. |
|
The ±
1400 civilian personnel of POMS Management have been
included in the NTC peacetime strength only. The official order of
battle (NIMH 430, inv. nr. 54) does not include personnel strengths for
POMS Management. |
| 14. |
|
Taken
from Sorrell, op. cit.,
45-47, with enhancements from NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 1952, VVKM 162
Oorlogsmemorandum der Koninklijke Marine 1981-1982, 3-6 and Bremer, op.
cit., 14-17. See also Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, Met de blik,
324-327. Intricate
unit
filling and reserve system: see Gijsbers, Blik
in de smidse, 2222-2231;
Selles,
Personele
vulling;
Berghuijs, Opleiding,
14-23; in English: Isby and Kamps, Armies,
341-343; Sorrell, op. cit., 94-96; Van
Vuren, The
Royal Netherlands Army Today, Military Review April 1982, 23-28. Host
Nation Support: see Roozenbeek, In
dienst, 200-202 and Sorrell, op. cit., 105-107. |
| 15. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 374, Natrespels d.d. 26 februari 1980. Ibid., inv.
nr. 546, Planningsmemorandum verdere uitbreiding NATRES d.d. 10 juni
1983, 8-9. Hoffenaar en Schoenmakers, November Romeo,
Hoofdstuk 3 t/m 6. Schoenmakers, 40 jaar, hoofdstuk 7. Sorrell, op. cit., 96. |
| 16. |
|
Applicants
for NATRES that were (administratively) assigned to a
mobilisable
unit would, if possible, be exempted. Hoffenaar en Schoenmakers, November Romeo,
116. |
| 17. |
|
However,
the quality and operational readiness of the active-duty territorial
security
infantry companies, and the mobilisable companies filled with the
reservists
who had served in them, may have also been
questionable.
Throughout
the Cold
War many of the active-duty companies had a consistently bad reputation that was not
entirely undeserved: medical, social and
behavioural problems resulted in unrest and undermanned units.
These problems appear to
have at least in part been caused by personnel selection methods which
gave these
units a low priority, sending the higher-rated draftees to 1 (NL) Corps units. Bevaart et al., Vijftig jaar,
98-99, 118-120, 126; Engbersen en
Oosting, Infanteriebeveiliger,
328. |
| 18. |
|
NATRES
expansion: a new recruitment campaign in 1989 was to expand the Corps
further, eventually to 191 platoons and 43 company staffs with a
total organic strength of 277/936/6270 (7483). The end of the Cold War
however aborted these plans. Schoenmakers, op.cit., 74. See also Unit Organisation and Equipment, The Territorial Security Infantry Company.
|
|