Royal
Army
Koninklijke
Landmacht (KL)
Part I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V
Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Army
Staff (Non-Ministerial Part) [a] |
Den
Haag |
113/76/31/130
(350)
|
14/7/7/60
(88) |
War
Staff Commander-in-Chief of the Army [b] |
– |
–
|
180/163/201/97
(641) |
Army Staff
Corps Command [c] [d] |
Den
Haag |
3/16/35/14
(68) |
4/22/125/13
(164) |
Ministry
of Defence Corps Command (Army) [d] [e] |
Staff
Detachment
Ministry of Defence Corps
Command (Army)
|
Den
Haag |
3/10/2/6
(21) |
3/10/3/6
(22) |
A
Company |
Den
Haag |
1/6/2/1
(10) |
–
|
B Company |
Den
Haag |
1/6/2/1
(10) |
2/6/3/2 (13) |
C Company
[f] |
Den
Haag |
1/4/1/2
(8) |
2/6/2/2 (12) |
|
6/26/7/10
(49) |
7/22/8/10
(47) |
General
Affairs Section [g] |
Wassenaar |
4/-/-/27
(31) |
16/15/- (31) |
Notes
a. |
The
Commander-in-Chief of the Army (Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten,
BLS) was also Chief of Staff of the Army
(Chief of the Army Staff) (Chef Landmachtstaf, CLAS). The staffs of
both functions were referred to as, respectively, the
Non-Ministerial and the Ministerial Part of the Army Staff
(Landmachtstaf, LAS). The
Non-Ministerial Part was concerned with the operational
effectiveness of the Royal Army's military units and installations, the
Ministerial Part handled the underlying operational policies
of
the Royal Army. See Ministry
of Defence,
where the Ministerial Part of the Army Staff is indicated in
the organisational chart by the Chief of Staff of the Army. It was
co-located with the Non-Ministerial
Part of the Army Staff in Den Haag and had a peacetime strength of
106/32/20/139
(297), and a wartime strength of 26/17/7/77 (127). The
non-ministerial part of the Army Staff included an Intelligence
and Security Division (Afdeling Inlichtingen en Veiligheid), whose Head was also Head
of the Army Intelligence Service
(Landmachtinlichtingendienst, LAMID). The LAMID was part of the Army
Staff administratively but fell directy under the Minister of
Defence.1 |
b. |
For
eighty-six percent filled by
personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.2
It seems likely, however, that at least part of the
peacetime personnel of the Army Staff (Non-Ministerial and/or
Ministerial)
would go to the War Staff. Personnel strength is from December
1985; in June 1985 strength was 180/161/124/96 (561).
The increase may be linked to the disbandment of Army Staff
Corps Command (see note c). |
c. |
Filled out
by personnel from
the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.2
Disbanded
between June and December 1985. After disbandment its
tasks were probably transferred to Ministry of Defence Corps Command
(Army) and perhaps to the War Staff. |
d. |
Contrary
to what their names suggest these two "corps commands" had
nothing to do with 1 (NL) Corps.
It appears they exercised administrative control over, and provided
service support to the various staff and administrative
organisations under the authority of the
Non-Ministerial Part of the Army Staff (Army Staff Corps Command) and
the Ministerial Part of the Army Staff (Ministry of Defence Corps
Command (Army)).3
|
e. |
Organisation
and strengths from December
1985. In June 1985 this was a peacetime-only unit, comprising Staff
Detachment (4/14/1/22 (41)), A Company (2/6/2/4 (14)) and B Company
(2/6/4/4 (16)), total strength 8/26/7/30 (71). |
f. |
Formed
between June and December 1985. |
g. |
General
Affairs Section (Sectie Algemene Zaken, SAZ. In army documents
abbreviated as Sie AZ BLS) was the purposefully bland name for the "I"
or Intelligence branch of the Netherlands secret stay-behind
organisation (SBO). The mission of the Netherlands SBO was
to facilitate, organise and direct resistance
under
wartime enemy
occupation and maintain communications with Netherlands authorities in
non-occupied
territory, i.e. the government in exile. The "I" branch was
tasked with
gathering and
communicating military, economic and political intelligence and
counterintelligence. It would also organise the
infiltration and exfiltration of
persons and goods across the borders. SAZ formed the
staff
of the "I" network, comprising a section head and eight
bureaus: A
(secretariat), B-l (logistics), B-2 (intelligence), B-3 (infiltration
and exfiltration), C (communications), D (accountancy), E (technique
and development), and PC (project coordination). In the 1970s
and 1980s SAZ ran a covert network or 'field organisation'
of some 125 carefully selected and trained
voluntary
agents which would be activated if the country would come under enemy
occupation. SAZ was
co-located with the Foreign Intelligence Service in Wassenaar
(Inlichtingendienst
Buitenland, IDB) and effectively used that service as a
screen for its own activities. The
other branch of the Netherlands SBO was
the
"O" or Operations branch, tasked with psychological warfare,
stimulating mental resistance and
executing limited
sabotage actions in this context. Whereas "I" had an official, albeit
disguised presence in SAZ, "O" did not exist officially. Like
"I" it comprised a small staff
running a covert or 'sleeping' field organisation of carefully selected
and trained
voluntary agents. The agents of both branches led normal lives in
society, doing their training and preparatory work in their own time.
Though often
jointly referred to as O&I, also I&O, these were to a
high degree separate
organisations.
SAZ or "I" fell under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, "O"
fell under the Prime Minister's own Ministry of General Affairs
(Ministerie
van Algemene Zaken). In peacetime the activities of both branches were
coordinated by the head of the "O" branch, in his
coordinating role referred to as 'delegate', who was appointed by the Minister of
Defence
in consultation with the Prime Minister. This delegate
answered to the Minister of
Defence. The Netherlands SBO was not
integrated in any NATO command
structure but in peacetime preparatory arrangements were made
with the United Kingdom and the United States in what was
referred
to as the Tripartite Consultation.
In wartime SAZ and the staff of "O" would evacuate to a location in unoccupied territory from which they would run their
activated field organisations
by radio. This location would be an
underground facility in the United
States referred to as the Allied Clandestine Base (ACB). There both
staffs would be integrated into a single Netherlands National
Clandestine Service (NCS), but in occupied
Netherlands the two field organisations would continue to work
separately as much as
possible to maximise operational security. This emphasis
on damage limitation through
compartmentalisation was borne from traumatic experiences
in World War II
(Englandspiel)
and was maintained throughout the organisation. Both branches
preferred to work with single agents ("I") and independent
operative cells ("O") whilst they would use their own code
materials
and
encryption methods which would not be shared with US or other Allied
organisations. The Netherlands NCS would remain under
national control at all times, though it would participate in the
Allied Consultative Coordinating Group (ACCG) at NATO level. The CIA
reportedly considered SAZ to be
the best stay-behind organisation in (Western) Europe. The official
Royal Army order of battle and unit filling schemes show that at
some point after mobilisation all or nearly all SAZ personnel
would be replaced
by personnel from
the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation. This can be explained by the fact that the active SAZ
element would relocate to the United States; the mobilised SAZ element
in the
Netherlands would probably run operations as long as possible or
necessary and clean up before enemy occupation would come into
effect. The evacuation of the active SAZ element and the staff of "O"
would be the responsibility of the aforementioned Bureau PC of SAZ. In
1992, motivated by the end of the Cold War, the government ordered the
Netherlands SBO to be
disbanded. The disbandment of SAZ was completed in 1996.4 |
Part
I | Part II |
Part III | Part IV | Part V
Notes
a. |
Peacetime organisation. In wartime under
operational command of NATO's Northern
Army Group (NORTHAG). |
b. |
On
mobilisation Royal Army Training Command (COKL) would close down
and most of its personnel would go to their mobilisation
destinations in first-line units, whilst the remaining personnel would
form Army Training and Replacement Command (COAL).5 |
c. |
Wartime
organisation. In
peacetime the Royal Military Constabulary (KMAR) was
under command of
the Minister
of Defence. |
Part
I | Part II | Part III | Part IV | Part V
Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Royal
Military Academy [a] |
Breda |
76/54/24/159
(313) |
–
|
Higher War School
[b] |
Den
Haag |
36/7/1/16
(60)
|
–
|
Buildings,
Works and Sites Directorate [c]
|
Staff
Buildings, Works and Sites Directorate |
Den
Haag |
9/-/1/6 (16)
|
9/-/1/6 (16)
|
Engineer
Advisory Bureau |
Den
Haag |
5/-/4/10
(19)
|
5/-/4/10
(19)
|
Bureau
Preparations of Provisions to
Artificial Structures |
Utrecht |
4/8/5/25
(42)
|
4/8/5/25
(42)
|
Directorate
North Holland |
Amsterdam |
7/5/4
(16) |
7/5/4
(16) |
Directorate South
Holland |
Leiden |
10/5/5
(20) |
10/5/5
(20) |
Directorate Utrecht |
Amersfoort |
7/4/3
(14) |
7/4/3
(14) |
Directorate
Gelderland |
Apeldoorn |
12/6/6
(24) |
12/6/6
(24) |
Directorate
Overijssel |
Deventer |
6/4/4
(14) |
6/4/4
(14) |
Directorate
North Netherlands |
Assen |
7/5/4
(16) |
7/5/4
(16) |
Directorate
South West Netherlands |
Breda |
10/6/6
(22) |
10/6/6
(22) |
Directorate Brabant |
Breda |
8/5/5
(18) |
8/5/5
(18) |
Directorate Limburg |
Roermond |
5/4/3
(12) |
5/4/3
(12) |
Directorate Germany |
Greven
(GE) |
7/5/4
(16) |
7/5/4
(16) |
Materiel
Inspection Office |
Utrecht |
6/53/4/6
(69)
|
–
|
Freight
Transport Bureau USA [d] |
Dundalk
(US) |
-/2/-/3 (5)
|
-/2/-/3 (5)
|
Inspection
of Royal Army Medical Services [e] |
Den
Haag |
46/36/5/112
(199)
|
29/16/5/106
(156)
|
Military
Health Service [f] |
Utrecht |
3/9/11/35
(58) |
7/1/7/24
(39)
|
Dr.
A. Matthijsen Military Hospital [f] [g] |
Utrecht |
103/112/53/719
(987)
|
208/141/101/702
(1152)
|
Central
Military Pharmacy [f] |
Amsterdam |
8/6/-/29
(43)
|
8/6/-/29
(43)
|
Medical
Services Depot and
Repair and Collection Point [f] |
Amsterdam |
3/11/5/82
(101)
|
3/10/6/82
(101)
|
Military
Blood Transfusion Service and
Central Blood Bank Laboratory [f] [g] |
Amsterdam |
6/9/3/12
(30)
|
10/15/30/12
(67)
|
841
Topographic Service [h] |
Emmen |
-/-/-/211
(211)
|
2/-/-/209
(211)
|
Royal
Army Audiovisual Service [i] |
Den
Haag |
1/6/2/22
(31)
|
–
|
Arnhem
District Court-Martial |
Arnhem |
9/-/2 (11)
|
9/-/2 (11)
|
General
Mobile Court-Martial [j] |
– |
–
|
30/15/24
(69)
|
Notes
a. |
Provided the "A programme" or
"First Way" to become an officer in the Royal Army or the Royal Air
Force (primary officer schooling). Open for candidates with the proper
pre-university
education
(vwo).6 For the "B programme"
or "Second Way", see Royal Army Training Command, Special
Officer Training Centre. |
b. |
Provided the
secondary military education
programme for commissioned officers in the rank of captain. The main
components were the Staff Course (Stafdienst) and the subsequent Higher
Military Education study (Hogere Militaire Vorming, HMV), the latter
being for those found eligible during the
Staff Course.
HMV formed the highest
schooling available to Royal Army officers. In 1985 a tertiary
education level was under consideration, which would be
introduced
in 1987.7 |
c. |
Wartime organisation. In peacetime under
Directorate-General Materiel of the Ministry
of Defence.8 |
d. |
Wartime Organisation. In peacetime under
command of the Ministerial Part of the Army Staff (see Part
I, note a). Located in Dundalk, Baltimore (US). Bureau
Aan- en Afvoer Goederen was previously known as Bureau Goederenvervoer
(BGVV). The name change may indicate a functional change. In
1983 the Bureau, then located in New York City under its
former
name, operated as a coordinating agent for the shipment of military
materiel acquired in the United States for the Netherlands armed forces.9 |
e. |
Wartime organisation. In peacetime under
command of Director of Personnel Royal Army, Ministry
of Defence. |
f. |
These
were so-called "special organisation units" (bijzondere organisatie
eenheden, BOE) of the Director of Personnel Royal Army, permanently
attached to the Inspection of Royal Army Medical Services (see
note e).10
|
g. |
Filled
(out) by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in relevant functions up to twelve and a half years prior to
mobilisation.2 |
h. |
Also
known as Topografische Dienst (TDN). Produced military maps for the
armed forces. Some 40 personnel were based in Delft as an auxiliary
branch.11
Storage and distribution of maps was handled by 402 Map
Storage and Distribution Group and 401 Map
Distribution Platoon. |
i. |
Previously known as Leger Film- en Fotodienst
(LFFD). |
j. |
Filled by
personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years
prior to
mobilisation.2 |
Part
I | Part II
| Part III | Part IV | Part V
Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Military
Penitentiary Centre Nieuwersluis |
Nieuwersluis |
4/53/7/2
(66) |
4/56/7/2
(69)
|
449
Counterintelligence Detachment [c] |
Arnhem |
7/17/1/7
(32)
|
8/21/2/7
(38)
|
450
Counterintelligence Detachment [d] |
Alphen
a/d Rijn |
7/20/2/7
(36) |
8/25/3/7
(43)
|
451
Counterintelligence Detachment [e] |
Breda |
9/13/1/8
(31) |
10/21/2/8
(41)
|
Netherlands
Censorship Service [f] |
Inspection
Netherlands Censorship Service
|
Harderwijk |
1/-/-
(1) |
41/11/13
(65) |
Censorship
Detachment Amsterdam |
– |
– |
148/68/65
(281)
|
Censorship
Detachment Den Haag |
– |
– |
113/57/57
(227) |
Censorship
Detachment Rotterdam |
– |
– |
86/52/44
(182) |
|
1/-/-
(1) |
388/188/179
(755) |
893
Fieldpost Censorship Detachment [g] |
– |
–
|
8/55/96
(159)
|
Royal
Army Personnel for Staff UNIFIL [h] |
Naquoura
(LE) |
3/3/2 (8) |
–
|
Infantry
Company (UN) [i] |
Haris
(LE) |
12/32/110/1
(155) |
–
|
Netherlands
Sinai Detachment [j] |
El
Gorah (EG) |
7/17/54
(78) (107)
|
–
|
Notes
a. |
Filled
by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in relevant functions up to twelve and a half years prior to
mobilisation.2 |
b. |
Temporary unit, to be activated on
mobilisation.
Filled by professional personnel on active duty from Royal Military
Constabulary District Utrecht
(KMAR District Utrecht) and equipped with DAF YP-408 armoured personnel
carriers. In documents
the wartime mission of G Squadron was neutrally described as "to carry
out assignments issued directly
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army" but it
has been public knowledge for some time that
its mission was
to secure and evacuate the Royal Family in case of an enemy attack. The
squadron exercised this several times per year. On completion of
its wartime mission the
squadron would be disbanded, its personnel going back to their units in
KMAR District Utrecht and its materiel going to other units or
back into the war reserve stock (oorlogsreserve); the YP-408s
would go to armoured infantry units. Such, at least, was
the war planning up
until ± 1984. In 1980 Beatrix of Orange-Nassau had succeeded her mother
Juliana as Queen of the Netherlands, and since Beatrix had taken up
residency in Den Haag the squadron's location near Juliana's
residence in Soestdijk (Baarn), some 88 kilometres to the east, had
become less than practical. Moving the squadron to KMAR
District South
Holland was problematic because the necessary materiel
infrastructure was not available there.
From about 1984 the larger, multiple-day exercises ceased. In March
1986 the squadron's YP-408s were disposed of as part of
the general phasing-out of the YP-408. After that the squadron
employed M113A1 armoured personnel carriers, possibly borrowed
from the high-readiness Armoured Car Platoon 2.6 based in
Den Haag (Royal Military Constabulary District South Holland) or coming from the war reserve stock.12 |
c. |
Under operational
control of the Head of the
Intelligence and Security Division of the Army Staff (Afdeling Inlichtingen en Veiligheid van de Landmachtstaf). Area of
responsibility: the
provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe
and Overijssel. Would handle offensive and defensive
counterintelligence tasks; provide counterintelligence support, both
requested and unrequested, to various military authorities, staffs and
installations of the Royal Army and the Ministry
of Defence;
and provide counterintelligence support to NATO staffs, units
or
organisations present in the detachment's area of responsibility.13 |
d. |
See note c. Area of responsibility: the
provinces of North
Holland, South Holland and Utrecht.13 |
e. |
See note c. Area of responsibility: the
provinces of Zeeland,
North Brabant and Limburg.13 |
f. |
Filled
by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.2
This included some 350 reserve officers. After the
proclamation of a State of War (Staat van Oorlog) and Martial Law
(Staat van Beleg) the Netherlands Censorship Service would not only
work to prevent the leaking of any information considered to be of
importance to the interests and security of the State, it would also
collect or enable the collection of such information for intelligence
purposes, and pass it on to the appropriate institutions. The three
censorship detachments would censor
all PTT communications, whilst a number of (probably senior)
civil servants of the PTT
would work to facilitate the operations of the Service.14
|
g. |
Filled
by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.2
Responsible for military censorship within the Royal Army and the Royal Air
Force.15 |
h. |
Most of this personnel was withdrawn to the
Netherlands a few days after Dutch Infantry Company returned home (see
note i).16 |
i. |
Under operational
control of United Nations Interim Force In
Lebanon (UNIFIL). The company performed peacekeeping duties in
South Lebanon from November 1983 to October 1985. Its official United
Nations (UN) designation was Dutch Infantry Company (DIC),
usually shortened to Dutchcoy. It comprised a company staff, three
rifle platoons (each with 2 x Carl Gustav rclr 84 mm, 3 x FN
MAG gpmg 7.62 mm and 3 x mortar 2 inch), a signal group and a service
support platoon. Apart
from standard personal gear, armament, and telex equipment
the company used UN-owned equipment, including
vehicles. The company was withdrawn to
the Netherlands on 24 October 1985 and disbanded
on
arrival.17 |
j. |
Part of the Multinational Force and Observers
(MFO) deployed in the Sinai peninsula to oversee the 1979 Egypt-Israel
peace treaty. Main component was an interservice signals
company which maintained internal MFO communications from company level
upwards, and external communications with MFO Headquarters in Rome and
with Cairo and Tel Aviv. Apart from Royal Army personnel (including Royal Military Constabulary) the
detachment also included personnel from the Royal Navy (including Marine
Corps) and the Royal Air
Force. In the table above
only Royal Army personnel is counted; in 1986 overall strength
of the Netherlands Detachment was 107 men and women.18
|
Part
I | Part II
| Part III |
Part IV | Part V
Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Army
Attaché Washington |
Washington
(US) |
3/2/-/3 (8)
|
3/2/-/3 (8)
|
Army Attaché Bonn |
Bonn
(GE) |
2/1/-/1
(4) |
2/1/-/1
(4) |
Army Attaché
London |
London
(UK) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
Army Attaché
Paris |
Paris
(FR) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
Army Attaché
Warschau |
Warschau
(PL) |
1/2/-
(3) |
1/2/-
(3) |
Army Attaché
Belgrade |
Belgrade
(YO) |
1/1/-/2
(4) |
1/1/-/2
(4) |
Army Attaché
Cairo |
Cairo
(EG) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
Army Attaché
Damascus |
Damascus
(SY) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
Army
Attaché Paramaribo |
Paramaribo
(NS) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
1/1/-/1
(3) |
Army Attaché
Jakarta |
Jakarta
(ID) |
1/1/-
(2) |
1/1/-
(2) |
Netherlands
Liaison Mission to SHAPE [a] [b] |
Casteau
(BE) |
3/1/1 (5)
|
6/3/3 (12)
|
Royal
Army Personnel for SHAPE [b] |
Casteau
(BE) |
20/18/24
(62) |
22/17/29
(68) |
Netherlands
Administrative Corps SHAPE [b] |
Casteau
(BE) |
1/6/5/1
(13) |
1/5/7/1
(14) |
Royal
Army Personnel for HQ AFCENT [b] [c] |
Brunssum |
25/58/69
(152) |
27/63/80
(170) |
Netherlands
Administrative Corps AFCENT |
Brunssum |
3/14/16/2
(35) |
3/7/4/2
(16) |
Royal
Army Personnel for HQ NORTHAG [b] [d] |
Rheindahlen
(GE) |
27/16/64
(107)
|
41/22/126
(189)
|
Royal
Army Personnel for HQ TWOATAF [b] [e] |
Rheindahlen
(GE) |
2/4/3
(9) |
2/4/4
(10) |
Netherlands
Administrative Corps
NORTHAG/TWOATAF [b] |
Rheindahlen
(GE) |
6/17/27/2
(52) |
7/24/67/2
(100) |
Netherlands
Signal Squadron [f] |
Rheindahlen
(GE) |
4/18/95
(117) |
4/23/183
(210) |
Various
foreign-country positions |
Den
Haag |
9/-/-/1
(10) |
– |
Royal Army Peace
Strength: 4706/14486/33158/12502 (64852) |
Royal Army War
Strength: 12789/30292/146515/9260 (198856) |
Notes
a. |
SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. |
b. |
Filled
by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in relevant functions up to six and a half years prior to
mobilisation.2 |
c. |
AFCENT: Allied
Forces Central Europe. |
d. |
NORTHAG: Northern
Army Group. |
e. |
TWOATAF:
Second Allied Tactical Air Force. |
f. |
Wartime strength probably filled out by
personnel on Short Leave.19
Operational in peace and wartime. As part of NORTHAG Signal Group (NSG)
the company would set up and sustain communications
for Headquarters, NORTHAG. NSG further included Belgian,
British
and West German signal companies, each of which operated a specific
part of the communications system. The Netherlands Signal Squadron
(NATO abbreviation: NSSQ) provided a messenger service and layed all
cables and lines.20 |
_________________________________________________
1. |
|
NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.110,
11. Intelligence
and Security Division of the Army Staff and the Army
Intelligence Service: Kluiters, De
Nederlandse, Supplement,
127. There was a large overlap between the two, i.e. many personnel
worked for both organisations. Army Intelligence Service falling under the Ministry of Defence: Kluiters, loc.cit. |
2. |
|
NIMH 205A/10,
Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d.
27 mei 1980. Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983. Ibid., d.d. 17 juni 1985. |
3. |
|
NL HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr.
111, Organisatieonderzoek Korpscommando MvD d.d. 30 juni 1976. Ibid.,
inv. nr. 133 (Korpscommando Landmachtstaf, 1973-1979). NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 84, Wijziging org Korpsco MvD (La) d.d. 6 februari
1970. Ibid., inv. nr. 896, Voorlopig plan opheffen Korpsco MvD La (1e
termijn) d.d. 6 november 1991. These documents do not contain an exact
description of the tasks of both commands, but they do
provide a
good overall impression. |
4. |
|
Bekker,
Geschiedenis,
Hoofdstuk VI, VII, VIII (internal SAZ history). PIVOT 166 (Engelen, De
Nederlandse stay behind-organisatie). Engelen, Lessons
Learned. Kluiters,
De
Nederlandse, 306-317. Schoemaker, De
Nederlandse. For a historical overview
in English and details about operational methods and equipment, see
website Crypto Museum, Operatiën en Inlichtingen.
Purposefully
bland
name: "General Affairs Section" might of course also be interpreted
literally, as being a section of the Ministry of General
Affairs
placed under military command, in which case the name would be less
bland. When
the name was adopted in 1949 the official explaination was that
SAZ would handle affairs that could not be assigned to the
other sections of the Army Staff (then called General Staff). PIVOT 166, 30-31. O&I:
because of increasing attention by the press
the names of the "O" and
"I" branches were changed to "A" and "B" respectively in 1986.
Bekker, op. cit., Hoofdstuk
VIII,
128. Kluiters reports that "O" comprised a staff of ± 20
persons
and a field organisation of 100-150 trained agents. Kluiters,
op. cit., 308. Foreign
Intelligence Service (Inlichtingendienst Buitenland, IDB):
like "O" this service fell under the Ministry of General Affairs.
Kluiters, op. cit., 201. IDB as screen for SAZ:
De Graaff
en Wiebes, Villa
Maarheeze, 53, 215. Contrary
to
Schoemaker's claim in op. cit., 28, the
staff of "O" was not co-located with IDB and SAZ in Wassenaar. Bob de
Graaff, co-author of Villa
Maarheeze, lecture in Villa Maarheeze, Wassenaar,
15.09.2019. Also, such a co-location would be inconsistent
with the separation between "I" and "O". Psychological
warfare: "The planned use of
propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary
purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior
of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement
of national objectives." US
Department of Defense Dictionary, 349-350. In this
case for "hostile foreign groups" may just as much be read "the Dutch
population". The best
in Europe: De Graaff en Wiebes, op. cit., 324. Unit
refilling after mobilisation: see footnote 2. Disbandment: PIVOT 166, 69. Many thanks to
Royal Army
Brigadier-General J.R. Mulder (Rtd.) for
pointing
out the role of SAZ and providing additional
information. In 1996
he was Head of the Intelligence and Security Division of the Army
Staff
and handled the disbandment of the last remnants of SAZ (emails
27.08.2019, 03.09.2019, 13.09.2019). |
5. |
|
VS
2-1050/1A, VI-17 t/m 19. |
6. |
|
Groen en Klinkert, Boekenwijsheid.
Sinterniklaas, Officiersopleidingen.
Sorrell, Je
maintiendrai, 53-54. |
7. |
|
Hoffenaar en
Schoenmaker, Met de blik,
442. Sorrell, loc. cit. The Higher War
School (sometimes and perhaps more fittingly translated as
Army Staff
College) is discussed in detail in Bosch en Smits, Herziening. |
8. |
|
The
NL-HaNA archive inventory of the directorate contains a remarkably
extensive organisational history: NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.96, 7-32. |
9. |
|
Anonymus,
Andere
werkwijzen. |
10. |
|
NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.125,
17. |
11. |
|
Tabak, Ze kunnen, 7-9. |
12. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1338, Reorganisatie Maresk (G) orgtnr. 25.1013.02
d.d. 12 september 1978.
NL-HaNA 2.13.175, inv. nr. 140, Stafstudie d.d. 16 juni 1980. Website
DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, G-Eskadron
Koninklijke Marechaussee. Ibid., Fotoalbum Peter Nijmeijer.
Additional information kindly provided by Peter Nijmeijer who served
with the squadron from 1974 to 1985 (emails
19.03.2019, 30.03.2019 and 01.04.2019). The order for the
'Royal'
evacuation mission was known as
"Operatieve
instructie nr. 4 van de BLS". NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1338, Aantekeningen bij ontwerp otas
Marechaussee-eskadron G d.d. 1 maart 1978, Aantekening HOPNA. The DAF
YP-408 armoured personnel carrier was originally designed for this
mission (in 1956-1958) before it was adopted as armoured personnel
carrier for the
armoured infantry of 1 (NL) Corps. Website
DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, De
DAF YP 408, een koninklijk voertuig
by S. Ruys. G Squadron was deployed twice in 1975: in March to secure
Soestdijk Palace against a (thwarted) plan by South Moluccan terrorists
to take Queen Juliana hostage, and in December when South
Moluccan
terrorists occupied the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam.
Website
DAF YP-408 Forgotten Hero, G-Eskadron
Koninklijke Marechaussee.
YP-408 replaced by M113A1: Gaasbeek, Verplaatsing, 19. Given its location Armoured Car Platoon 2.6
is a likely candidate, also because after Queen Beatrix took up
residence in Den Haag there was talk within G Squadron that its mission
might be transferred to that unit. Peter Nijmeijer,
email 19.03.2019. On the other hand, the official Royal Army orders of
battle from 1988 to 1991 list Complex Zeisterspoor in Soesterberg and
later Mobilisation Complex Soesterberg
as the squadron's equipment storage location, which might indicate
that M113A1s would be taken from the war reserve stock. NIMH 430,
inv. nrs. 60 t/m 68 (Slagordes KL 1988-1991). |
13. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv. nr. 1308 (Operationele instructies voor commandanten van
contra-inlichtingendetachementen, 1978). |
14. |
|
NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.111, 7-9.
This article also mentions a core staff (kernstaf) which is not
indicated in the official orders of battle (NIMH
430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL
stand 1 juli 1985). Ibid.,
inv.
nr. 55 (Slagorde KL stand 23 december 1985)).
It appears this core staff was part of the Inspection
Netherlands
Censorship Service. Ibid., 15. PTT: the national postal,
telegraph, and telephone service (Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie).
|
15. |
|
NL-HaNA, archiefinventaris 2.13.111, 8-9. |
16. |
|
Schoenmaker en
Roozenbeek, Vredesmacht,
385, 417. |
17. |
|
SSA-MvD,
Archief Chef Landmachtstaf/Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten
1980-1989, gerubriceerd, inventarisnummer 4002e, Memorandum Realisatie
Legerplan 92-4-A (Uitzending zelfstandige Infanteriecompagnie VN naar
Libanon) d.d. 7 november 1983. Schoenmaker
en Roozenbeek, op. cit., 379, 383-385, 417. |
18. |
|
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 370-371. Van den Anker, De
Multinational, 74, 75, 80. Hakkert,
Het
Korps Mariniers, 467. |
19. |
|
The
company is not included in the Royal Army unit filling schemes (see
footnote 2). |
20. |
|
Elands et
al., Van telegraaf, 155.
Hoffenaar and Krüger, Blueprints,
56. |
|