1 (NL) Corps
Eerste
Legerkorps (1 Lk)
Part I | Part II | Part
III | Operational
Corps and Divisional Command Structures | Operational Role | Maldeployment
| Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
| Staff 1 (NL)
Corps |
Apeldoorn |
117/86/126/9
(338) |
168/132/217
(517) |
| Staff
Company 1 (NL) Corps |
Apeldoorn |
4/18/71 (93)
|
6/30/220/2
(258) |
| Staff
and Staff Company Administrative Centre 1 (NL) Corps |
–
|
– |
62/82/298/8 (450) |
| 101
Military Intelligence Company |
Apeldoorn |
23/8/24
(55) |
84/15/82
(181) |
| 111
Counterintelligence Detachment |
Apeldoorn |
9/29/10
(48) |
18/46/15
(79) |
| 103
Reconnaissance Battalion [a] |
Seedorf
(GE) |
27/96/402
(525) |
30/127/573/2
(732) |
| 104
Reconnaissance Battalion [b] |
Nunspeet |
27/96/403
(526) |
31/126/575/2
(734) |
| 102
Reconnaissance Battalion [c] |
– |
– |
32/126/575/2
(735) |
| 105
Reconnaissance Battalion [d] |
– |
– |
32/126/574/2
(734) |
Notes
| a. |
Under command of 4
Division in peacetime.1
Probably also under that command in wartime.2
|
| b. |
Under command of 1
Division "7 December" in peacetime.3 Probably also
under that command in wartime.2
Formed between November 1983 and March 1984.4 |
| c. |
RIM
battalion, filled by
mobilisable squadrons that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in 104 Reconnaissance
Battalion between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.5 33 Likely to operate in
the Corps Rear Area in wartime.2 |
| d. |
RIM battalion, formed
between November
1983 and March
1984.
Filled by
mobilisable squadrons that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in 103 Reconnaissance
Battalion between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.6
33
Likely to operate in
the Corps Rear Area
in wartime.2 |
| e. |
Filled by
mobilisable personnel from 102 Reconnaissance Battalion (RIM) after
their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up
to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation. The
battalion was disbanded
after the formation and equipping of 105 Reconnaissance
Battalion (November 1983-August 1985) was completed. Disbandment
started in September 1985 and was completed in January
1986, in which period equipment and stocks were reassigned
to other units or added to
the national stockpile (landsvoorraad).5 7
|
Part I | Part II | Part III | Operational
Corps and Divisional Command Structures | Operational Role
| Maldeployment
| Staff and
Staff Company 1 Division "7
December" |
Arnhem |
28/30/80
(138) |
52/43/134
(229) |
| Staff
and Staff Company 4 Division |
Harderwijk |
28/30/80
(138) |
52/43/134
(229) |
| Staff
and Staff Company 5 Division [a] |
Stroe |
8/9/10 (27) |
52/44/133
(229) |
Note
| a. |
Filled
out by mobilisable personnel
that had fulfilled their active-duty period in the staff and staff
companies of 1 and 4 Division up to six and a half years prior to mobilisation.5 |
Part I | Part
II | Part III
| Operational
Corps and Divisional Command Structures | Operational Role
| Maldeployment
| 1
(NL) Corps Driving School |
Vierhouten |
-/6/10 (16) |
– |
| Johan
Willem Friso Band |
Assen |
3/54/25 (82) |
3/54/28 (85) |
| 1
(NL) Corps Peace Strength: 2375/6305/24053/83
(32816) |
| 1
(NL) Corps War Strength: 5659/13867/67727/266
(87519) |
Note
Operational
Corps and
Divisional Command Structures
Although 1
(NL) Corps included three divisions, these were not fixed formations as
for instance in the British or US Army. During operations Commander, 1
(NL) Corps would allocate brigades and corps level
assets to the divisional staffs depending the tactical
situation, reallocating them as circumstances required. The
three divisional staffs thus were pure tactical headquarters, each
commanding between two and five brigades and whatever units they would
receive from corps level. The brigades were the main
operational elements, designed to be able to operate independently for
up to forty-eight hours, each having their own artillery, engineers and
logistic support.8
Within this adaptable command structure the brigades were the only
permanent formations, retaining their units as much as
possible. 1
(NL) Corps command structure is illustrated in the
organisational chart below, with brigades assigned as in peacetime.9
As
a further illustration, the chart below shows possible wartime
configurations for 1, 4 and 5 Division, including
attachments from corps level. These
configurations have been
derived from various publications about established supporting roles during divisional exercises
and outlines of operation plans for the
main
defensive battle, in particular those for the period 1979-1985 (see
further below).10
It should be noted that alhough
the brigades were to retain their identity, they would not
fight in
their organic order of battle but form combined-arms battle groups:
see Unit Organisation and Equipment, Mixed Battalions and Company Teams. <
Operational Role
The
map below shows the area in West Germany that was to be defended
by 1 (NL) Corps in the event of an armed conflict
between NATO and Warsaw
Pact. In such an event 1 (NL) Corps would be
placed under operational command of NATO's Northern
Army Group (NORTHAG). Its war assignment, as
formulated
by Commander,
Northern Army
Group (COMNORTHAG), would be to
a. Assume
responsibility for its corps sector and relieve 1st German
Corps forces as soon as possible.
b. Fight the covering force battle in accordance with COMNORTHAG's
concept of operations.
c.
In the main defensive battle: (1) hold and destroy the forces of the
enemy's leading armies conventionally as far east as possible,
maintaining cohesion with I (GE) Corps; (2) in the event of a major
penetration affecting 1 (NL) Corps sector, be prepared to hold
the
area between the roads A7 and B3 and to conduct a counterattack
according to COMNORTHAG's concept of operations.
d. Maintain cohesion with LANDJUT and secure NORTHAG's left flank in
the Forward Combat Zone . 11
As
the map shows, 4 and 1 Division would take up positions around
Lüneburg and Uelzen respectively, with 5 Division further to the rear
as corps reserve. In front of the two divisional sectors the covering
force would operate, of which force 41 Armoured Brigade formed the
nucleus. The
Corps Rear Area would be secured by 101 Infantry
Brigade, probably in conjunction with 102 and 105 Reconnaissance Battalion.12
The main thrust of an enemy attack was expected to fall
upon the southern
part of the corps sector, which is reflected
in COMNORTHAG's instruction
to hold the area between the A7 and B3 roads (shaded on the
map below).13 For a larger context see NATO Commands, NORTHAG Area of Responsibility in West Germany, 1985.
1 (NL) Corps Sector in West
Germany, 1979-1989 14
Between
1979 and 1985 the
corps concept of operations for the main defensive battle emphasised
defence at the FEBA (Forward Edge of
Battle
Area), with five armoured infantry brigades deployed in first line
behind the Ilmenau and the Elbe-Seitenkanal (ESK). Lying on
the
expected main axis of the enemy attack, 1 Division would be assigned
three field
artillery groups
comprising up to fourteen field artillery battalions, whilst 4 Division
would get one field artillery group with up to six
battalions. The first-line brigades were to counter or limit
enemy
penetrations, whilst 41 and 51 Armoured Brigade would be kept in
reserve to participate, if necessary, in a corps-level
counterattack led by the commander of 5 Division. It
was
thought that such a counterattack in all likelihood would
require the
release of tactical nuclear weapons in order to be succesfull.15
In
July 1985 a new concept of operations came into force
which prescribed
a more fluid, terrain-oriented defence in depth. No longer was the
enemy to be halted as far east as possible; he was now to be
denied passage through the corps sector. Four rather than five
armoured infantry brigades would be deployed in first line, tasked to
hold the vital grounds west of the line Lüneburg-Uelzen, about halfway
the
divisional sectors. Reserves would no longer be used primarily to
support
these defensive operations, but rather to execute
counterattacks in which the armoured brigades would be used to
strike at weak
points in the enemy's deployments. Such counterattacks would not so
much serve to restore the initial FEBA but to maintain
possession of the aforementioned vital grounds. Should
this first
stage of the main defensive battle fail then the
defence would be continued deeper into the corps sector, further west,
if necessary with the support of tactical nuclear weapons.16
To the
north of the Netherlands corps sector, across the Elbe
river, lay the area that was to be defended by Allied Land Forces
Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT), a joined Danish-German force
that did not fall under NORTHAG but under Allied Forces Baltic
Approaches (BALTAP), which was subordinate to Allied Forces
Northern
Europe (AFNORTH), whereas NORTHAG fell under Allied Forces Central
Europe
(AFCENT).17
This meant that 1 (NL) Corps formed the left flank of both
NORTHAG and AFCENT. Adjoined
on its right was I (GE) Corps, of which 3
(GE) Armoured Division had the vital role of (temporarily)
fleshing out the covering force in case of alarm; a
role necessitated by the maldeployment of 1 (NL) Corps. <
Maldeployment
In response
to the Warsaw Pact's growing military capability to mount a surprise
attack,18 NATO operation plans
since 1969 prescribed a minimum military warning time of
forty-eight hours. This meant
that 1 (NL) Corps had to be
able to deploy to its corps sector and take up battle positions within
such time. Meeting this requirement was
no small challenge.19 Apart from its forward-deployed
element the
corps was based in the
Netherlands, about 350 kilometres from its sector of responsibility
(see the map below). It is worth noting that this included the corps staff, located in
Apeldoorn, which made 1 (NL) Corps the only corps in NORTHAG not
headquartered in West Germany. In NATO circles this maldeployment of
forces caused serious doubts about the ability of the Netherlands
corps to deploy to its
wartime positions in time, doubts that were compounded by its
high
dependence on mobilisation.20
The efficiency of the Dutch reserve and mobilisation systems
notwithstanding, the fact remained that about
sixty percent of 1 (NL) Corps had to be mobilised before being
able to begin deployment.21
"The
greatest problem facing the Dutch," an observer concisely noted, "will be getting to the war."
22
1 (NL) Corps Maldeployment 23
Of
course the maldeployment of 1 (NL) Corps was not merely "the greatest
problem facing the Dutch" but, moreover,
a substantial operational risk
for NATO commanders, as both
Commander-in-Chief Allied
Forces
Central Europe (CINCENT) and COMNORTHAG saw their left flank
potentially 'hanging in the air'. In wartime this
could ultimately
result in an early request for the release of tactical nuclear
weapons by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).24
In 1977 both SACEUR
and CINCENT had tried to persuade the Netherlands
government to station at least one more brigade in West Germany, as
others had done before them. The Dutch however remained reticent,
mainly because
of the financial consequences.25
Instead several measures were
undertaken to improve the reaction time of 1 (NL) Corps.
These included:
- Increasing
the readiness
of the forward-deployed element by bringing 41 Armoured Brigade
and 41 Engineer Battalion up to near war
strength
and forward-storing the materiel for its remaining Short Leave
components, which measures were effectuated between 1983 and
1986;
26
- Upgrading
the rail transport plan for tracked vehicles and logistic
support
by expanding the specialised rail stock from 75 to
478 special flatcars and building four
military rail yards with loading ramps in
the Netherlands. The complement of
flatcars, the delivery of which was completed in 1986, enabled the tank
and
armour-heavy units to arrive in the area of operations twenty-four
hours earlier. The first rail yard, at 't
Harde, was
completed in 1987;
27
- Establishing
nine
Forward Storage
Sites (FStS) for military supplies (such as combat rations,
fuel
and ammunition)
in the corps sector, as part of a common-funded NATO project. By 1985
four FStS were operational: at Sehlingen (completed in 1980), Töpingen
(1980), Dünsen (1983 or 1984) and Hellwege (1984 or 1985);
28
- Implementing an improved mobilisation
plan which advanced the mobilisation of 5 Division by calling
up one brigade in each of the three mobilisation phases, rather than
mobilising all three brigades in the last phase as previously had been
the case. This was put into effect in 1979; 29
- Forming a new Corps Command (Legerkorpscommando) in
Germany, which would include a forward-deployed detachment of 1 (NL)
Corps Staff whose main task would
be to direct the approach march and
deployment of 1 (NL) Corps in wartime. Also integrated in this
command would be the Command of
Netherlands Troops in Seedorf, Hohne, Langemannshof, 201
Service Support Command and Corps Rear Area Command. Preparations
began in 1989 but
were cancelled in 1990.30
Effective
though these measures were, they did not negate the
fact
that 1 (NL) Corps remained unable to meet the forty-eight hour
minimum reaction time set by NATO.31
This inability
to immediately defend the corps sector
would continue to be a cause for concern in NATO until the end
of the
Cold War.32
<
_________________________________________________
| 1. |
|
Elands, Harderwijk, 151,
154. Rens, Huzaren
van Boreel, 363, 365, 373. Felius, Einde oefening,
161. < |
| 2. |
|
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, Met de
blik, 388. < |
| 3. |
|
Elands, Van Gils en
Schoenmaker, Geschiedenis
1 Divisie, 232, 233. Schulten,
Zwitzer en Hoffenaar, 1
Divisie, 153, 154. < |
| 4. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 514, Planningsmemorandum Reorganisatie
Tank- en Verkenningseenheden d.d. 1 november 1982, Bijlage I-B. Rens,
op. cit., 402-403. < |
| 5. |
|
NIMH 205A/10,
Aflossing van
mobilisabele eenheden en
-aanvullingen d.d. 27 mei 1980. Ibid., d.d. 11 november 1983.
Ibid., d.d. 17
juni 1985. < |
| 6. |
|
Unit
filling: ibid. Formation: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, loc.
cit. < |
| 7. |
|
SSA-MvD,
CLAS/BLS 7486, Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 149-9B d.d. 13 februari
1986. < |
| 8. |
|
In
NORTHAG, Belgian and, to a lesser extent, West German brigades were
organised
similarly. Isby and
Kamps, Armies,
63, 64, 177,
182.
Dragoner, Bundeswehr,
Teil 2.1 (passim). Forty-eight hours: Roozenbeek, In dienst, 224.
Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 325. < |
| 9. |
|
Felius,
op. cit., 161. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 234. Isby and
Kamps, op. cit.,
325-327. Cornelese, De 1 Divisie, 394-395. Miller
(in Cold War,
239) oddly equates the command structure of 1 (NL)
Corps with the
results of a
reorganisation in the British Army in the late 1970s, in
which the brigades were disbanded
to form task forces of variable composition within the divisions, a
reorganisation that turned out to be fundamentally flawed and had to be
reversed in the early 1980s (Miller, op. cit., 234; also described in
Isby and Kamps, op. cit.,
240-241). This is not to say that there weren't any doubts about
whether the perceived flexibility of 1 (NL) Corps
command would
indeed result in actual operational flexibility; see for
instance
Van den Doel, Divisiestaf. < |
| 10. |
|
Elands, Van Gils en
Schoenmaker, op. cit., 237. Felius,
op. cit.,
161. Hoffenaar,
Van Hoof en De Moor, Vuur
in beweging, 233.
Schulten, Zwitzer en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 153. The corps
concept of operations (Operatieplan nr. 1)
specified that in
wartime 12 Armoured Infantry Brigade
would be assigned to 4 Division, and 43 Armoured Infantry Brigade to 1
Division, at least initially. Felius, op. cit.,
218, 231. Felius, email 30.07.2008. On a
similar note, Elands (in Harderwijk,
168) mentions that 102 Reconnaissance Battalion was to be placed under
command of 4 Division in wartime. < |
| 11. |
|
a-d quoted from
Felius, op.
cit.,
305. The Forward Combat Zone ran in a north-south direction across West
Germany. The Netherlands corps sector effectively formed the
northernmost part of this zone in NORTHAG's area of
responsibility. VR
2-1386, I-25. < |
| 12. |
|
In
wartime Commander, 101 Infantry Brigade would
be double-hatted as Commander, Corps Rear Area Command. See
also
101 Infantry Brigade, Operational Role. < |
| 13. |
|
Expected
main thrust of the enemy attack: Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op.
cit., 213, 249-250.
Hoffenaar en
Schoenmaker, op. cit., 355. < |
| 14. |
|
VS
2-1380, 6-1. VR 2-1386, loc. cit. Elands, Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit.,
249-250. Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 356. Isby and
Kamps, op. cit., 15. De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 82. < |
| 15. |
|
Elands,
Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit.,
213.
Hoffenaar en
Schoenmaker, loc. cit. De Jong en Hoffenaar,
Op herhaling,
115. Also of
interest is this map, found on the fok.nl forum
in a thread about
the Netherlands Army during the Cold War. Its exact
provenance,
though evidently military, is unclear; it appears to have been made for
a presentation. Somewhat
puzzling is the combination of the year 1978 and the appearance of 104
and 105 Reconnaissance Battalion,
which were only formed between November 1983 and March 1984. < |
| 16. |
|
Elands,
Van Gils en Schoenmaker, op. cit.,
238-239, 249. Hoffenaar
en
Schoenmaker, op. cit., 384-385.
De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 116. < |
| 17. |
|
NATO Handbook,
56-57. Martin, Before
The Day After, 14-15. Mechtersheimer und Barth, Militarisierungsatlas,
20-21. For an overview of NATO's military command structure,
see NATO Commands.
< |
| 18. |
|
Hoffenaar en
Schoenmaker, op. cit., 342. From 1977
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE)
began to anticipate the possibility of an attack by
the
Warsaw Pact's large standing forces, without prior mobilisation, if
Soviet leaders for whatever reason would feel war to be inevitable.
Ibid., 378. In
the 1980s eighty-five percent of the East German army (Nationale
Volksarmee, NVA) maintained what basically amounted to a
permanent
state of alert,
with units able to deploy from their barracks in
full combat readiness within two hours after alarm; Soviet units
stationed in East Germany (the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
GSFG) maintained a similar combat readiness.
Hoffenaar and Krüger, Blueprints, 179. Naumann, NVA,
88-89, 340.
For a detailed and contextual account of NVA operational war plans for
1983-1985, which involved extensive offensive operations against 1 (NL)
Corps, see Lautsch, Zur Planung, 20-33. < |
| 19. |
|
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 230-231, 343-344. Roozenbeek, op.
cit., 203.
It will be noted that,
apart from deploying forces to their battle positions, an
effective
defence would require these positions to be prepared. A NATO study from
the late 1970s concluded that "the time needed for deployment of
covering forces into position should be measured in days
rather than in
hours. For absolute readiness, which includes digging in, erecting
obstacles, zero-ing in pre-planned artillery fires in front of
positions, cutting down trees, cratering roads, placing charges on
bridges, laying mines, and other defensive preparations, at least the
better part of a week would be needed subsequent to authorisation."
Betts, R.K., Surprise
Attack (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982),
173; quoted in Golden, Clark and Arlinghaus, Conventional Deterrence, 116. See also 101 Engineer Combat
Group, Operational Role and 41 Armoured
Brigade, Operational Role: The Corps Covering Force. < |
| 20. |
|
Serious doubts: see
for instance HTK 1982-1983, kamerstuknr. 17704
ondernr. 3
(stenographic report of SACEUR and others being heard by the
Dutch
parliament's standing committees for foreign affairs and defence), 7-8, 13; Cordesman, Central Region Forces,
120-121; Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 318; Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op.
cit., 343-344, 385; De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 122. < |
| 21. |
|
Selles,
Personele
vulling, 456.
Of the Royal Army's war strength more than two thirds was mobilisable
in some form. HTK 1983-1984,
kamerstuknr. 18169 ondernr. 2 (Defensienota 1984-1993), 106.
Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit.,
343-344. Kuyt, Nederland
mobiliseert, 19. The minimum time scheme for the Royal
Army's entire mobilisation plan
was ninety-six hours. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 346. < |
| 22. |
|
My italicisation, HB. Golden, Clark and
Arlinghaus, op. cit., 142; also quoted in Hoffenaar en
Schoenmaker, op. cit., 385. < |
| 23. |
|
HTK
1983-1984, op. cit., 107. Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 344. The peacetime locations in the
Netherlands are only roughly
indicated. < |
| 24. |
|
HTK 1982-1983, op. cit.,
8, 13. The release of
nuclear weapons would, ultimately, be decided upon by the president of
the United States. See also 1 (NL) Corps Artillery, Dual
Capable Artillery. < |
| 25. |
|
Hoffenaar en
Schoenmaker, op. cit, 258-259, 344-345. < |
| 26. |
|
SSA-MvD,
CLAS/BLS 7643,
Memorandum Realisatie Legerplan 120-B d.d. 22 maart 1985. See further 41 Armoured Brigade, note a and
footnote 8; also 101 Engineer
Combat Group, note c. < |
| 27. |
|
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit, 385. Roozenbeek, op. cit., 206-208. The
remaining three military rail
yards (in Dutch: raccordementen), at Assen, Amersfoort and
Eindhoven (Oirschot), were not
built before 1990. HTK
1990-1991, kamerstuknr. 21991 ondernr. 3
(Defensienota 1991), 124. Website Forten Info, Koude Oorlog Landmacht.
478 special flatcars enabling tanks and armour-heavy units to
arrive twenty-four hours earlier: in the 1970s, when the army had 75
special flatcars, it would take seventy-two hours to transport all
tanks of 1 (NL) Corps to the area of operations. Roozenbeek, op. cit.,
168. < |
| 28. |
|
See also Corps
Logistic Command, Forward Storage Sites. < |
| 29. |
|
Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 346. De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 115. The
new mobilisation plan followed the mechanisation and
restructuring of 5 Division, which
took place between 1975 and
September 1979 (Operatie Omega). Schoenmaker,
5
Divisie, 304-305. < |
| 30. |
|
HTK 1988-1989,
kamerstuknr. 20800 X ondernr. 43.
Ibid., ondernr.
185b, 17. HTK 1989-1990, kamerstuknr. 21300 X ondernr. 48,
3. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 385. < |
| 31. |
|
For example, in 1979 and
1986 43 Armoured
Infantry Brigade was brought up to war strength within
twenty-four hours during the (virtually) annual mobilisation exercise "Donderslag," but it took up to
another twenty-four hours for the
brigade to be ready for deployment to the corps sector. De Jong en Hoffenaar, op. cit., 120-121;
this is also mentioned in Felius, op. cit.,
275-276.
Schoenmaker, op. cit.,
305, also notes fourty-eight hours as the maximum time span for the RIM
units of 5 Division to be mobilised and made combat-ready. < |
| 32. |
|
Ibid., 122. < |
| 33. |
|
RIM was
the Dutch acronym for Direct Influx into Mobilisable Units (Rechtstreekse
Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). For a survey of the
Royal Army's unit filling and reserve system see Gijsbers, Blik
in de smidse, 2222-2231;
Selles,
Personele
vulling;
Berghuijs, Opleiding,
14-23. In English: Isby and Kamps, Armies,
341-343; Sorrell, Je Maintiendrai, 94-96; Van Vuren, The Royal Netherlands Army Today, Military Review April 1982, 23-28. < |
|