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Army Training and Replacement Command
Commando Opleidingen en Aanvullingen Landmacht (COAL)


Part I | Part II | Operational Role: Wartime Personnel Replacement


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Unit Location Peace Strength War Strength
Staff and Staff Company
Army Training and Replacement Command [a]
Amersfoort 22/25/57 (104)
   
811 Replacement Depot [b]
Staff and Support Company
811 Replacement Depot
21/115/32/33 (201)
A Company 11/67/312 (390)
B Company 15/42/342 (399)
C Company 15/42/342 (399)
D Company 15/42/342 (399)
E Company 8/39/321 (368)
F Company 6/37/256 (299)
G Company
H Company
I Company
J Company
K Squadron
L Squadron
  91/384/1947/33 (2455)
 
812 Replacement Depot [b]
Staff and Support Company
812 Replacement Depot
9/44/13/17 (83)
A Company 11/66/299 (376)
B Company 15/42/342 (399)
C Company
D Company
  35/152/654/17 (858)
       
813 Replacement Depot [b]
Staff and Support Company
813 Replacement Depot
14/78/24/23 (139)
A Company 15/42/342 (399)
B Company 11/67/312 (390)
C Company 15/42/342 (399)
D Company 11/66/299 (376)
E Company
F Company
G Company
H Company
  66/295/1319/23 (1703)
   
814 Replacement Depot [b]
Staff and Support Squadron
814 Replacement Depot
13/69/18/21 (121)
A Squadron 10/28/185 (223)
B Squadron 10/28/185 (223)
C Squadron 16/57/242 (315)
D Squadron 16/69/282 (367)
E Squadron
F Squadron
G Squadron
H Squadron
  65/251/912/21 (1249)
   
815 Replacement Depot [b]
Staff and Support Battery
815 Replacement Depot
11/60/16/20 (107)
A Battery 62/105/237 (404)
B Battery 62/105/237 (404)
C Battery
D Battery
E Battery
F Battery
  135/270/490/20 (915)
   
816 Replacement Depot [b]
Staff and Support Company
816 Replacement Depot
9/41/12/16 (78)
A Company 6/44/300 (350)
B Company
C Company
D Company
  15/85/312/16 (428)
   
817 Replacement Depot [b]
Staff and Support Company
817 Replacement Depot
11/57/16/24 (108)
A Battery 8/22/128 (158)
B Company 18/40/62 (120)
C Company
D Company
E Company
F Company
  37/119/206/24 (386)
   
818 Replacement Depot [b]
Staff and Support Company
818 Replacement Depot
10/48/14/18 (90)
A Company 2/-/52 (54)
B Company
C Company
D Company
E Company
F Company
G Company
H Company
  12/48/66/18 (144)

Note
 
a. Wartime organisation. Formed on mobilisation from the remaining personnel of Staff, Royal Army Training Command after the disbandment of that command, and filled out under the GRIM system by mobilisable subunits that had fulfilled their active-duty period in said staff unit between four and twenty months prior to mobilisation.1 8
b. It will be noted that all replacement depots include empty companies. The reason of this is not clear to me. It may be that there was an administrative backlog or that the depots would only be filled out completely on mobilisation. Together the depots were to be filled with some 11,000 initial replacements.



Part I | Part II | Operational Role: Wartime Personnel Replacement


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819 Replacement Depot [a]
Staff and Support Company
819 Replacement Depot
8/31/11/13 (63)
A Company -/16/56/ (72)
B Company
C Company
  8/47/67/13 (135)
   
820 Replacement Depot [a]
Staff and Support Company
820 Replacement Depot
9/41/12/15 (77)
A Company 22/12/230 (264)
B Company
C Company
D Company
  31/53/242/15 (341)
   
821 Replacement Depot [a]
Staff and Support Company
821 Replacement Depot
9/37/14/14 (74)
A Company 4/20/288 (312)
B Company
C Company
D Company
  13/57/302/14 (386)
   
202 Personnel Replacement Battalion [b]
Staff and Support Company
202 Personel Replacement Battalion
70/162/236/4 (472)
A Company 15/42/342 (399)
B Company 15/42/342 (399)
C Company 15/42/342 (399)
D Company 14/64/312 (390)
E Company 14/63/289 (366)
F Company 8/37/356 (401)
G Battery 58/89/280 (427)
H Company 19/85/275 (379)
I Company 16/68/289 (373)
J Company 24/40/314 (378)
  268/734/3377/4 (4383)
   
56 Infantry Battalion [c]
Staff and Support Company
56 Infantry Battalion
A Company
B Company
C Company
Combat Support Company
 
   
Army Training and Replacement Command Peace Strength: –
Army Training and Replacement Command War Strength: 798/2520/9951/218 (13487)

Notes
   
a. See Part I, note b.
b. Filled by personnel from the general pool of mobilisable reserves (vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty period up to five and a half years prior to mobilisation. In case of mobilisation however this inactive period may have been much shorter.3
c. For some reason 56 Infantry Battalion, the last mobilisable infantry battalion to be disbanded in the context of the 1974 Defence White Paper, still lingered in the 1985 Royal Army order of battle as a purely administrative entity. No personnel or equipment was assigned.4

Operational Role: Wartime Personnel Replacement 5


Army Training and Replacement Command, formed on mobilisation from Royal Army Training Command, was responsible for compensating combat losses of Royal Army units by providing replacement personnel. The wartime personnel replacement system may be summarised as follows: 202 Personnel Replacement Battalion would replenish 1 (NL) Corps units via 101 Personnel Replacement Battalion (Corps Logistic Command). 202 Replacement Battalion would also replenish Royal Army units present in the Rear Combat Zone, for example National Logistic Command units. The replacement depots would refill 202 Personnel Replacement Battalion and, in addition, replenish the remaining Royal Army units directly.6 At the replacement depots the replacements would receive refresher training and/or a shortened training programme. The replacements themselves, finally, were drawn from the large general pool of mobilisable reserves, which held reservists without a mobilisation destination (i.e. reservists who were not assigned to an operational unit).
   
The Command was designed to maintain a replacement reserve comprising the equivalent of fifteen combat day losses, based on an estimated general attrition rate of 800 men per combat day (dead and wounded) for the entire Royal Army. Of these fifteen combat day equivalents, five would be held by 202 Personnel Replacement Battalion and ten by the replacement depots. The estimated attrition rate however dated from 1966 and was therefore completely behind the times by 1985. In 1981 the Army had produced a new study of the expected casualty rates, resulting in an updated and more detailed attrition estimate that predicted significantly higher losses, especially in the first combat days:

Combat Day Losses 1 (NL) Corps
and Rear Combat Zone
Losses other
Royal Army Units
Losses Total
1 1330 men 315 men 1645 men
2 to 8 2265 men 315 men 2580 men
9 to 22 1158 men 210 men 1368 men
After day 22 701 men 158 men 859 men

For the wartime personnel replacement system these numbers were to be corrected downwards because, for example, a number of the wounded would return to their units after (ambulatory) medical treatment. After correction the estimated required replacement capability of the system looked like this:

Combat Day Replacements for
1 (NL) Corps and
Rear Combat Zone
Replacements for other
Royal Army Units
Replacements Total
1 1175 men 280 men 1455 men
2 to 8 2000 men 280 men 2280 men
9 to 22 1020 men 190 men 1210 men
After day 22 620 men 140 men 760 men

In 1985 a complete compensation of the expected losses would not be possible. In September 1984 the maximum capacity of the replacement system was reported to be 800 men per day for 1 (NL) Corps, 25 men per day for the Rear Combat Zone, and some 300 men per day for other Royal Army units. Not only had the estimated attrition rate been outdated, the entire system was in urgent need of modernisation and restructuring. Already by the end of the 1970s it had become clear that it would not function properly: procedures were slow, internal coordination was inadequate and the system would take too long to become fully operational once mobilisation was declared. In 1983, whilst a new wartime personnel replacement system was under study, an emergency plan was implemented to address the most pressing deficiencies. Budgetary constraints however meant that no fundamental changes could be made. In April 1985 the Army Board approved the following additional measures, revealing rather fundamental shortcomings:
  • Automation of personnel data processing at all necessary levels (partly realised in 1985)
  • Increasing the number of replacements in the system and restructuring the replacement flows to meet the 1981 attrition rate estimate
  • Increasing the number of transport vehicles
  • Issuing to each replacement a personal weapon, (additional) standard personal gear and NBC kit upon call-up
  • Increasing the Command's training capacity to guarantee that each replacement would have the (minimum) necessary training before being sent to an operational unit
  • Partly integrating the personnel and materiel replacement systems (vehicles or weapon systems with crews)
  • Advancing elements of the Command in the mobilisation sequence to improve readiness 
As the Army Board did not approve the financial consequences it would seem that only some of these measures were (partly) effectuated in the period 1985-1988. In 1988 the new wartime personnel replacement system was still in the planning phase, scheduled to become operational in 1989. The automation project was completed in 1988 and tested during the 1 (NL) Corps Field Training Exercise (FTX) Free Lion.7 <

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1. VS 2-1050/1A, VI-18. NIMH 205A/10, Aflossing van mobilisabele eenheden en -aanvullingen d.d. 11 november 1983 en 17 juni 1985.
2. The empy companies are mentioned, but not explained, in NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 629, Memorandum betreffende de personeelsaanvulling in oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 9 april 1985 (drawn up in September 1984), 12. Number of initial replacements: ibid.
3. NIMH 205A/10, loc. cit. shows that the battalion was filled with new reservists every three years. There were however ways to assign "fresher" reservists on mobilisation: before passing on to a mobilisable unit reservists would be administratively collected during the formation period of that mobilisable unit (up to two years); during that period they would be avaiable for the wartime personnel replacement system. NL-HaNA 2.1.182, inv. nr. 755, Planningsmemorandum personeelsaavullingssysteem in oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 6 juli 1988, 11. 
4. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 643, Planningsmemorandum Legerplan 162 (Reorganisatie Infanterie) d.d. 1 augustus 1985, 8. When 44 Armoured Infantry Battalion was deployed to Lebanon in 1979 for United Nations (UNIFIL) peacekeeping duties, 55 Infantry Battalion (mobilisable), also scheduled to be disbanded in the 1974 Defence White Paper, was retained and added to 52 Armoured Infantry Brigade to fill the gap. After 44 Armoured Infantry Battalion returned in October 1983, 55 Infanty Battalion was added to 101 Infantry Brigade. Ibid.
5. NL-HaNA 2.13.110, inv. nr. 1468, Concept-eindrapport van de Werkgroep Personeelsaanvullingssysteem in Oorlogstijd d.d. 7 december 1979. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 629, Memorandum betreffende de personeelsaanvulling in oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 9 april 1985 (drawn up in September 1984), met Aantekening voor de Legerraad. 
6. The non-combattant Mobile Column Corps however had its own replacement depot
7. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 755, Planningsmemorandum personeelsaavullingssysteem in oorlogstijd binnen de Koninklijke Landmacht d.d. 6 juli 1988, met nota voor de Legerraad.   
8. RIM was the Dutch acronym for Direct Influx into Mobilisable Units (Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). GRIM was a variant of this system, meaning "Largely RIM" (Grotendeels Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). For a survey of the Royal Army's unit filling and reserve system see Gijsbers, Blik in de smidse, 2222-2231; Selles, Personele vulling; Berghuijs, Opleiding, 14-23. In English: Isby and Kamps, Armies, 341-343; Sorrell, Je Maintiendrai, 94-96; Van Vuren, The Royal Netherlands Army TodayMilitary Review April 1982, 23-28.