Marine Corps
1
Korps
Mariniers (KMARNS)
Part
I | Part II | Part III | Force Profile | Operational Roles |
UK/NL Landing Force
|
Mobilisable
Reserve
Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Headquarters
Marine Corps |
Rotterdam |
21/20/8/13
(62)
|
22/32/28/13
(95) |
Notes
a. |
Until 14
March 1985 based on barracks
ship A 891 Hr.Ms. Soemba, thereafter on
the new 'boatel' A 887 Hr.Ms.
Thetis. Composed of para, commando and arctic-trained frogmen
specialised in amphibious reconnaissance, sabotage and maritime
counterterrorism
operations. Partly winterised and integrated in the Special
Boat Squadron
(SBS)
of the British Royal Marines (RM) as 7 (NL) Special Boat Section (7
(NL) SBS), which
was earmarked for wartime deployment to northern Norway as
part of
the United
Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force (UK/NL LF)
under Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
(SACLANT). For certain
counterterrorism operations, notably concerning offshore oil
and
gas installations (oil platforms) in the North Sea, part of
the
section would
be detached to the Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit (BBE-M).2
|
b. |
Specialised
in mountain and arctic warfare.
In principle the entire company was para-trained.
Considered "probably one of the most expert NATO arctic
warfare
units [...] equal to the best RM units in this type of
warfare".
During training periods and exercises Whiskey Infantry Company was
fully integrated into 45 (UK) Commando Group RM,
forming this unit's fourth rifle company, and was earmarked
to
be deployed as such to northern Norway in wartime as part of
UK/NL
LF. The company was attached to 45 (UK) Commando Group RM for
the
larger part of the year, and about three months a year were
spent
on joint exercises.3
|
c. |
Trained in mountain
and arctic warfare and earmarked to
be deployed to northern Norway in wartime as part of
UK/NL
LF. For this role 1 Amphibious Combat Group trained
with
the (UK) Royal Marines in the United Kingdom (predominantly
Scotland) and northern Norway
for twelve to fifteen weeks a year. When deployed as part of UK/NL LF,
or as needed, elements of the Amphibious Section and the Boat Company
Group would be
attached. On mobilisation the unit would be brought up to war strength
by adding a
fourth infantry company, which would for the most part be formed
from surplus
personnel ("bovenrol") from the Royal Naval
Institute
in Den Helder
(Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine, KIM), Van Braam Houckgeest
Barracks and, predominantly, Van Ghent Barracks. The specified unit
strengths are from 1982-1983; the added total strengths between
{braces} are undated, probably dating from ± 1984-1989 (peacetime) and
from July 1984 (wartime) respectively.4
5
|
d. |
Partly
dispersed over naval bases and
installations in the Netherlands and in the Netherlands
Antilles
(NA), and partly mobilisable. The specified unit strengths are from
1981-1983; the added total
strengths between {braces} are from July 1984. In that year,
after internal rationalisations
to increase the unit's operational readiness, 255 men were stationed in
the Netherlands, 305 men in the Netherlands Antilles, and 261 men were
mobilisable (32 percent of total wartime strength). For furher
specification, see Unit Organisation and Equipment, 2 Amphibious Combat Group. In
peacetime those elements stationed in the
Netherlands fell under Naval
Command Netherlands, with the exception of
the combat group staff which fell under Commander, Marine Corps; those
elements
stationed in the Netherlands Antilles fell under Naval Command
Netherlands Antilles. For the territorial defence of
the
Netherlands Antilles 2 Amphibious Combat Group could be concentrated
there; for its NATO role under SACLANT the unit would be
concentrated in the Netherlands. It could be assigned
to UK/NL
LF, but only for deployment
in non-arctic areas. In such case, or as needed, elements of
the
Amphibious Section
and the Boat Company Group would be
attached. Personnel of 2 Amphibious Combat Group periodically carried
out jungle
warfare training in French Guyana.5
6 |
e. |
Mobilisable
unit, to be deployed to
the
Netherlands Antilles and placed under Naval Command
Netherlands Antilles to
relieve 2 Amphibious Combat Group if that unit would be concentrated in
the Netherlands for its NATO role. To maintain proficiency parts
of 3
Amphibious Combat Group were periodically called up for a four-week
refresher training, probably once every four years.7
|
f. |
Mobilisable
unit, would support 1 Amphibious
Combat Group.8
|
g. |
Mobilisable
unit, would support 2 Amphibious Combat Group.8 |
h. |
Provided
limited amphibious
movement capability (ship
to shore, both tactical and logistical), operating ten Landing Craft
Assault (LCA). Integrated in 539 (UK) Assault
Squadron RM. Part of the Boat Company Group, referred to as
LCA-detachment (LCADET) was winterised and
earmarked for wartime deployment to northern
Norway as part of the UK/NL LF.
Besides the LCAs the unit also
held
and/or operated a number of Landing Craft Rubber
Motorised (LCMR).9 |
i. |
Double-roled
as counterterrorism/navy policing unit. As Marine Corps
Special Assistance Unit
(Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Mariniers, BBE-M, also BBE-MARNS) it was
one of three
high-readiness Special Assistance Units (Bijzondere Bijstandseenheden,
BBE) available
to the Minister of Justice for counterterrorism
operations in peacetime. BBE-M
was specialised in close
quarters combat and was operational in both peace and
wartime. We may assume that in wartime the unit would operate under
military command. In wartime (part of) BBE-M might be deployed as part
of a
regular marine combat unit, for instance 1 Amphibious
Combat Group.
Staff, training
and one platoon (Alert Platoon BBE/1st MP
Platoon)
were located at
Van Braam Houckgeest Barracks in
Doorn. A second platoon (Reserve Platoon BBE/2nd MP Platoon) was
based at Naval
Barracks Willemsoord
in Den Helder, from where it could deploy quickly to counter
hostile actions against the naval base in Den Helder
or offshore
oil
and
gas installations in the North Sea. For the latter type of
operations, or as needed, part of the Amphibious
Section would be
attached. BBE-M was deployed several times during the
1970s. Direct-action operations were executed in October 1974
to
free hostages taken by terrorist/criminal prisoners in Scheveningen
prison; in June 1977 to free hostages from a train near De
Punt
and, simultaneously, from a primary school in Bovensmilde held by
South Moluccan terrorists; and in March 1978 to free hostages from
Drenthe
Province Hall (provinciehuis) in Assen, again taken by South Moluccan
terrorists. Apart from regularly exercising with its two sister units
BBE-M regularly cross-trained with foreign
counterterrorism
units such as SAS (UK), GSG 9 (GE) and US special forces. As
Shore
Patrol Division Netherlands (Afdeling Marinepatrouilles Nederland,
AMPNED)
the unit performed limited military policing duties, messenger services
and ceremonial duties within the Royal Navy. It seems likely
that in
wartime these duties would, at least in part, be taken over by the
mobilisable Shore Patrol Company Netherlands.10
12
|
j. |
Mobilisable
unit, tasked to guard wartime headquarters of the Royal
Navy in the Netherlands,
probably in addition to its normal policing
role. Its platoons would be mobilised at
different locations (see the table above, second column, mouseover) and
the company would probably not operate as a single unit.11
12
|
Part
I | Part II
| Part III |
Force Profile |
Operational
Roles |
UK/NL Landing Force
|
Mobilisable
Reserve
Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Van Ghent Barracks [a] |
Rotterdam |
23/87/80/6
(196) |
22/69/89/6
(186) |
Van Braam
Houckgeest Barracks [b] |
Doorn |
36/165/142/9
(352) |
30/118/137/9
(294) |
Joost Dourlein
Barracks [c] |
Texel |
5/33/53/1
(92) |
5/30/57/1
(93) |
Marine
Barracks Savaneta [d] |
Aruba
(NA) |
13/81/138/6
(238) |
8/33/40/6
(87) |
Detachment
Suffisant [d] |
Curaçao
(NA) |
5/24/77/12
(118) |
3/16/25/12
(56) |
Marine
Band of the Royal Navy [i] |
Rotterdam |
3/54/6/2
(65) |
– |
Marine
Corps Drummers and Fifers [j] |
Rotterdam |
–/11/3
(14) |
–/1/– (1) |
Notes
a. |
Van Ghent Barracks was the
centre for military education and training of both professional
and conscript personnel. It also housed the Marine Band and part of the
Marine Corps Drummers and Fifers.13
|
b. |
Van Braam Houckgeest
Barracks was the centre for unit training and various
advanced and specialist courses. It also included the Centre for
Physical Training and Sport (Centrum voor Fysieke Training en
Sport, CFTS). Whiskey Infantry Company, 1 Amphibious Combat
Group,
the staff of 2 Amphibious Combat Group, and the Alert Platoon BBE-M/1st
MP
Platoon of the Marine Corps
Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division
Netherlands were
based here.13 |
c. |
Joost Dourlein
Barracks provided all amphibious training for the Royal Navy
and
the Marine Corps, and was the home base of the Boat Company
Group.
Also regularly training here were the Belgian Para-Commando Regiment.
Until 17 May 1983 the barracks were known as Amphibious Training Camp
(Amfibisch Oefenkamp, AOK).14
|
d. |
Under
the operational authority of Naval Commander Netherlands
Antilles in peace and wartime; see Naval Command Netherlands Antilles.15
|
e. |
Under
the operational authority of Naval
Commander Netherlands in peace and
wartime.15
|
f. |
The
peacetime strengths
of these detachments as given here, per 1982-1983, include
elements of 2 Amphibious Combat
Group. As in 1984 those elements were concentrated on two rather than
four main locations (at Naval Air Stations Valkenburg
and De Kooy),
these peacetime strengths are not correct for 1985.
|
g. |
Strengths
include the Reserve Platoon BBE-M/2nd MP Platoon of the Marine Corps
Special Assistance Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands (see Part I, note i), and a
detachment of the Marine Corps Drummers and Fifers, the latter with a
strength of –/3/8 (11) in peacetime and –/3/7 (10)
in
wartime. |
h. |
In
peacetime these detachments included elements of 2 Amphibious
Combat Group (see Part I,
note d).
|
i. |
The
Marine Band of the Royal Navy was composed of professional musicians
with limited military training. In wartime band
members would
serve in mobilisation centres and
security detachments; it appears that a large portion of them
were trained in NBC reconnaissance (Nuclear, Biological,
Chemical)
and would be
deployed in such a role as part of the security detachments (see Part III).16
|
j. |
Contrary
to the Marine Band of the Royal Navy, the Marine Corps Drummers and
Fifers were fully trained marines serving in various
operational
(combat) units, naval installations, barracks and on ships; in
1982 four sub-officers of the Drummers and Fifers served with 20 Staff
and Support Company of 2 Amphibious Combat Group.16
|
Part
I | Part II | Part III |
Force Profile |
Operational
Roles |
UK/NL Landing Force
|
Mobilisable
Reserve
Security detachments [a] |
Unit |
Location |
Peace
Strength |
War
Strength |
Security
Detachment A |
– |
– |
4/23/76
(103) |
Security
Detachment B |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment C |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment D |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment E |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment F |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment G |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment H |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment I |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment J |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment K |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment L |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment M |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment N |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment O |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment P |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment Q |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment R |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment S |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment T |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment U |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment V |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment W |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment X |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Security
Detachment Y |
– |
– |
4/23/76 (103) |
Marine Corps
Peace
Strength: 254/1184/1512 (2950) [b] |
Marine Corps War
Strength: ± 555/2206/6889 (9650) [c] |
Note
a. |
When mobilised these
security detachments would fall under the
operational authority of Naval
Commander Netherlands,
guarding and securing naval bases and installations. They would
probably operate under his regional or local subcommanders;
see
Naval Command Netherlands, notably Part III. The location of
their mobilisation centres (see the table above, second column,
mouseover) probably gives a good indication of where they would deploy:
eight detachments would be mobilised in Den Helder, three in
Amsterdam, three in Valkenburg, two in Den Haag, six in
Rotterdam, and
three in Vlissingen.17
|
b. |
Peacetime
personnel strength as given is per 31 December 1985. The 254 officers
include 28 officer cadets and 10 reserve officer cadets (adelborsten).18
|
c. |
For the approximate
wartime strength the 1981 strengths of the
mobilisable reserve have been added: 301/1022/5377
(6700); see Mobilisable Reserve.
|
Force
Profile
The Marine Corps,
established in 1665, constituted the principal Dutch
out-of-area capability.19
It
was a small but versatile force, contrary to
developments in the Royal
Army composed of armed
men rather than manned arms. As we have seen,
its main specialisations (amphibious
operations, mountain and arctic
warfare, antiterrorism) comprised many sub-specialisms, often
concentrated in very small units or subunits. Though the
Marine
Corps declined to be referred to as an elite force, the Amphibious Section, Whiskey Infantry Company, the
reconnaissance platoons of 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group, and the Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit
could certainly be labeled as such.20
In 1985 authorised peacetime strength was 2,830 men, of which 85
percent
professionals and 15 percent conscripts. Conscript
marines served fourteen months. They
had to meet the same selection standards as applicants
for professional careers. These standards were high: in 1989
only 503
out of 3,512
conscripts that requested to serve in the Marine Corps were accepted
into
basic training (14,3 percent), during which another 48 men were found
unable
to meet
the
requirements. In
the same year 167 out of 815 men applying to serve as
professionals were accepted (20,5 percent), of which 31 did
not make
it through basic
training.21
This means that in 1989 a mere 13,6 percent of applicants entered
service.
Readiness of the first-line
units (see Part I) was
high: 1 Amphibious Combat Group was classed as a NATO A1 unit, which
meant that it was available for operational deployment within
forty-eight hours. This classification must have
also applied to Whiskey Infantry Company, the
Amphibious Section, and
probably to the Boat Company Group
as well. Given its role the high-readiness
Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit was most likely not assigned or
earmarked to NATO. Because of its dislocation and
responsibilities in the Netherlands Antilles, 2 Amphibious
Combat
Group was classed as a NATO B-3 unit: available for
operational deployment between five and fifteen
days (see further below).22
By
1985 the close working relationship between Dutch and British
marines, dating back to the early 1970s, had led to a deep integration
in terms of organisation, operations, logistics and materiel. In
1972 a Joint Marine Corps
Sub-Committee had been set up to "advise on the necessary
measures to enable
the Korps Mariniers within the limits of available manpower and money,
to standardise their organisation, training, equipment and tactics with
the Royal Marine Commandos". One year later a Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between the Netherlands and United
Kingdom ministries of defence, in which it was agreed
that Marine Corps units
would operate with 3 (UK) Commando Brigade Royal Marines (3 Cdo Bde RM)
as an immediate reaction force for the flanks of NATO, earmarked
to SACLANT.
The joint amphibious landing force that was the result of this
was designated the United
Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force.23
<
Operational Roles
24
The operational roles
of the Marine Corps can be divided into three main categories: NATO,
National, and United Nations.
1. NATO:
providing
amphibious-trained combat units for a maritime contingency force, more
in particular a Maritime Contingency Force
Atlantic (MARCONFORLANT), to be formed and deployed by SACLANT
for the execution of one of several contingency plans,
referred to
as Maritime Contingency Force Plans (MARCONFORPLANS). These plans were
meant to enable a direct and measured response to threats or acts of
aggression against NATO territory through the manifestation
of sea
power, including amphibious operations. In 1983 the following
contingency plans issued by SACLANT involved deployment of
Marine
Corps units:
- OPLAN
108-YR: "Amphibious support to AFNORTH [Allied
Forces Northern Europe] in contingency situations
(Ketch Rig)". This plan involved landings to reinforce NATO's
northern flank, both in Norway and in the straits of the Baltic Sea.
- OPLAN
109-YR: "SACLANT amphibious and reinforcement support of AFNORTH in
major contingency situations (Rough Bark)." As OPPLAN 108-YR, but one
step higher on the escalation ladder, involving a larger
MARCONFORLANT.
- OPLAN
113-YR "Support of island commanders (Main Mast)".
This plan involved operations, including landings, to reinforce the
military position of the islands in the NATO area
excluding Iceland, such as Greenland, the Faroe
Islands, the
Azores, Madeira, and Bermuda.
Further there was an "Agreement between SACLANT and SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]
concerning amphibious operations in support of SACEUR", which arranged
that SACLANT could deploy amphibious forces of the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and the United States in support of SACEUR for
the
execution of contingency plans as well as plans to be executed
on
a higher level of escalation (NATO Reinforced Alert).
According
to
this agreement the United
Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force was
earmarked to be deployed in the AFNORTH area of
responsibility:
Norway, Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. SACEUR's contingency plans
relevant to the Marine Corps were:
- OPLAN 10002 "Rapid
Reinforcement Plan for Allied Command
Europe (Jump Fast)". This plan included
strengthening NATO's northern flank
through deployment of the United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing
Force (UK/NL LF).
- OPLAN 10720 "SACEUR's contingency operation plan for
employment of amphibious forces in the northern region of ACE [Allied Command Europe]". This
plan enabled a deterrent response to actions of Warsaw Pact
forces against said region through
the deployment of multinational reinforcements. These reinforcements
included amphibious forces from the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom (UK/NL LF) assigned to SACLANT and from the
United States (probably a US Marine Amphibious Brigade or Force
(MAB/MAF)) assigned to SACEUR. The plan arranged for
a
joint deployment in the form of a Combined Landing Force, which
would operate under the authority of SACLANT up
to the
landing operations, during which SACEUR would take over operational
command.
Assigned
to the NATO role were 1 Amphibious
Combat Group, Whiskey Infantry Company, the 3rd
Amphibious Group of the Amphibious
Section (7 (NL) SBS) and the LCA-detachment (LCADET) of the Boat Company Group. These units
would operate as integrated parts of UK/NL
LF. Since 1983 2 Amphibious Combat Group
was also earmarked to SACLANT as UK/NL LF
component
for operations in non-arctic areas, provided its national role
allowed it. This meant that it would become available to SACLANT only
after it had been relieved in the Netherlands Antilles by
3 Amphibious Combat Group,
which had to be mobilised first. Another prerequisite was the
availability of the means to deploy the
unit; amphibious lift
capacity was scarce.
2. National:
providing amphibious-trained combat troops for contingency operations
and territorial defence in the Kingdom, more in
particular the Netherlands
Antilles (2 and 3 Amphibious Combat Group); providing combat units for
(peacetime) military assistance to the civil
authorities (1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group, Whiskey Infantry
Company), and for antiterrorism operations (Marine Corps Special Assistance Unit); and providing
operational units for guarding
and
securing naval bases and barracks in the Netherlands
and the Netherlands Antilles (Marine
Detachments, Security Detachments, Shore Patrol Company Netherlands).
For military assistance in the Netherlands
between one and five company-sized General Military Assistance Units
(Algemene Militaire Bijstandseenheden, AMBE) could be formed with
personnel from the operational combat units.25
3. United
Nations: providing operational amphibious infantry units
for military assistance during peacekeeping operations. For this role
a unit of ± 300 men strong could be
formed at twenty-four hours' notice; a second unit of similar
size
could be
made ready for deployment within two or three days. These units, also
to be formed from the operational combat units, were referred to as QPO
units or contingents (QPO-1 and QPO-3), after the Marine Corps'
motto "Qua Patet Orbis" ("As Far As The World Extends").25
In addition to these three main roles the Corps provided marines for
service on warships and naval bases and installations; provided
physical and infantry training for fleet personnel; and handled
transport, messenger, ceremonial and internal policing duties
throughout the Royal Navy (Shore Patrol Division Netherlands, Marine Band, Marine Corps Drummers
and Fifers). <
United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force
The
joint United
Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force (UK/NL LF) was basically 3
(UK) Commando Brigade Royal Marines with the
abovementioned
NATO-roled Marine Corps units integrated. The organisational chart
below shows the likely composition of the Landing Force for
deployment to northern Norway.26
United Kingdom/Netherlands
Landing Force, 1985 (Norway deployment)
Some
particulars and observations:
- To
optimise integration 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group had been
organised
and equipped similarly to the Royal (UK) Marine Commandos. Notable
differences: a RM commando had three rather than four
rifle companies and its combat support company had 18 x MILAN
rather than M47 Dragon antitank guided missile system (atgm). Peacetime
strength of a RM commando was 700 men, wartime
strength 800 men.
- 45 (UK) Commando RM was reinforced with Whiskey Infantry Company,
7 "Sphinx" Battery of 29
(UK) Commando Light
Regiment Royal Artillery and Condor Troop of 59 (UK) Independent
Commando Regiment Royal Engineers. This
configuration, designated 45 (UK) Commando Group
RM, also existed in peacetime.27
- 3
(UK) Commando Brigade Air Squadron
RM had 12 x SA 341 AH 1 Gazelle helicopter for
observation,
reconnaissance, liaison and evacuation; and 4 x Lynx AH 1
antitank helicopter, each armed with 8 x TOW
atgm.
- The (UK) Headquarters and Signals
Squadron RM incorporated an air defence troop, here probably
equipped with 8 x Blowpipe
man-portable
air defence system; during operations the
anti-aircraft section of 1 Amphibious
Combat Group
(with 4 x FIM-92 Stinger) would probably be placed directly
under
brigade command as well.28
- 29
(UK) Commando Light
Regiment Royal Artillery had three
gun batteries of
six 105 mm L118 Light Guns each (with one battery detached to 45 Cdo Gp
RM, as noted).
- 539 (UK) Assault
Squadron
RM had a complement of 4 x Landing Craft Utility (LCU), 8 x
Landing
Craft Vehicles & Personnel (LCVP), 30 x Rigid Raiding
Craft
(RRC), and 38 x Inflatable Raiding Craft (IRC).
- Although the
Landing Force, with a wartime strength of
approximately 5,400 men, was a light force in military
terms, it still had a considerable logistic
footprint: when deployed it would field some 1,050 wheeled vehicles and
620 trailers.
For Norway
deployment the Force had 296 x Volvo Bv 202
over-snow vehicle, of which 60 from the Marine Corps;
nearly all of these were forward-stored in Norway.29
The Landing Force,
together
with
the ships, landing craft and helicopters required to transport
the
force to the area of operations and enable it to land in a
tactical posture, was referred to as the United Kingdom/Netherlands
Amphibious Force (UK/NL AMF). In tems of naval support the Royal (UK)
Navy had available one light aircraft carrier (HMS Invincible or
HMS Illustrious), two Royal Fleet Auxiliary replenishment ships, and a
number of escort ships (destroyers/frigates). The Royal Navy had
earmarked three submarines, four P-3C
Orion long-range maritime patrol aircraft, and one escort
group for UK/NL AMF. An escort
group would either comprise one Tromp-class
command frigate,
six Kortenaer and/or Van
Speijk-class frigates
and one Poolster-class fast combat support ship;
or five Kortenaer and/or Van Speyk-class frigates.30
As has been noted above, amphibious
lift was scarce: the Royal Navy had no amphibious
shipping capacity, whilst
the Royal (UK) Navy's organic capacity was not even
sufficient for 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM alone. To deploy the Landing
Force one
amphibious assault ship (HMS Fearless or HMS Intrepid) and five
logistic
landing ships were available. Out of necessity the light
aircraft carrier mentioned
above would also mainly
operate to provide lift, deploying RM commando forces inland
with
helicopters before being assigned to its primary role of
anti-submarine warfare. Additional sealift would
be provided through the requisitioning of no less than ten civilian roll-on/roll-off
ferries: Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT). The 1973
Memorandum of Understanding had already stipulated that the
Royal (UK) Navy could not
guarantee lift for the entire Landing Force, so the Royal Navy would need to resort
to STUFT as well,
to be
drawn from the Dutch
merchant fleet. It appears that plans were indeed made for this.31
Before
deployment UK/NL LF would concentrate in the United Kingdom
(predominantly in the Plymouth area), which meant that the Marine Corps
units, with
all their
vehicles and equipment, would first have to be
ferried across the Channel via Hoek van Holland.32
The larger part of their war supplies (War Maintenance
Reserves, WMR) were stockpiled in the UK, however.33
Because of the risks involved with opposed landings, and the
probable
lack of adequate naval support once war would have started, NATO
doctrine strongly favoured UK/NL LF to deploy to the area of
operations
prior to
the outbreak of hostilities, preferably even ahead of NATO alert
measures. The lack of sufficient amphibious shipping
further necessitated the need for early deployment. It was estimated that
UK/NL LF could deploy to northern Norway in seven to
ten days using sealift.34
The
threat a Soviet occupation of northern Norway would pose to NATO's
war effort was described as "deadly" by SACLANT in 1984: the North
Atlantic sea lines of communications (SLOC), vital to the survival of
the Central Front, would be severely
compromised.35
Although UK/NL LF was earmarked for the AFNORTH
area, the British
Ministry of Defence in 1979 objected, with
success, to the fact
that a draft of SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan (OPLAN 10002) showed the Force as
dedicated to the Tromsø area: "While MOD (UK) welcome the opportunity
to declare North Norway as the most likely deployment option for the
arctic trained element of the UK/NL Amphibious Force, MOD (UK) would
not support total dedication as this negates the inherent flexibility
of amphibious forces." 36
Other deployment options, as outlined in the contingency plans,
remained on the table. So did a possible deployment on NATO's southern
flank: Greece and Turkey, although this was considered less
likely.37
<
Mobilisable Reserve
The Marine Corps had a
large pool of reservists that in wartime would mainly serve as
territorial security forces for the Royal Navy (see Part II and Part III
above).
In fact, there were many more reservists than were needed for
this. In 1981 Commander, Marine Corps produced an preliminary study on
the operational potential of his mobilisable reserve vis a vis its
wartime role.38 The study, apparently
requested by the Minister of Defence, charted the
possibility to relieve the Corps of its security duties
and use the pool of reservists to form
battalion-sized combat units that would be able to operate in
an
expeditionary role. From this interesting document we learn
that
- on
mobilisation the Marine Corps could dispose over 301/1022/5377
(6700) reservists,
bringing the Corps' war strength to 9,650 men;
- of
these 6,700 reservists 968 men (50/305/613) were needed to
bring 1, 2
and 3 Amphibious Combat Group up to war strength,
whilst
- 3,028
men (149/732/2147) would be needed for the various marine detachments,
the security
detachments
and the Shore
Patrol Company. The study concludes that this leaves
- 2,816
mobilisable men (102/-/2714) who were neither needed nor
assigned
to units.39
After
noting that this last group could be regarded as the Marine
Corps' actual mobilisable reserve, the report observed that
- the
larger part of high-grade and well-trained personnel available on
mobilisation was not assigned to first or even second-line combat
units; that
- 90 percent of mobilisable marines were
younger
than 35 years, and more than half of those were younger than
30 years; and that
- in terms of personnel a fourth amphibious
combat group could already be formed in the first
mobilisation phase.
Clearly
it was realised that using 3,000+ marines for security infantry duties
was not
an effective way to use the Corps' combat
potential, not
to speak of the 2,800+ reservists for which there was no direct
purpose. The
report
found that it would be possible to
form up to three mobilisable amphibious combat groups which, to keep
costs low, could be equipped with previously
phased-out support weapons (M40A1 recoilless rifles rather than M48
Dragon antitank guided missiles and M2
.50 inch machine guns rather than FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air
defence systems). By adding a staff company these three units
could be organised into a
mobilisable marine brigade, which might be used for
reinforcing vital points in the Atlantic
Ocean (see OPLAN
113-YR above),
or for
territorial defence.
Nothing, however, came of this.40
Apart from certain operational challenges (such as mobilisation
speed, the availability of sealift/amphibious lift and host
nation/logistic
support), for such a plan to be realised the security role would have
to be taken over by other forces, and
these were not at hand. Last but not least we can safely
assume that the defence budget offered no room for
the
investments needed: these were estimated
at ƒ28,550,000
(€12,955,425) per
amphibious combat group and ƒ3,600,000 (€1,633,608) for a brigade staff
company, bringing the estimated total costs of a mobilisable
marine
brigade to ƒ89,250,000
(about
€69,168,780 in today's money 41). <
_________________________________________________
1. |
|
As apparently
no comprehensive, official order of battle of the Marine Corps
survives (if indeed one ever existed), the data on this page
was
compiled
from a variety of sources. For the corps organisation the following
sources were used: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 366, NDPP
Krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Marine [concept] d.d. december 1979,
39, 87-88. Ibid., inv. nr. 535, NDPP
Concept krijgsmachtdeelplan Koninklijke Marine 1984-1993 d.d. maart
1983, 32-33, 72-74. NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, voorlopige studie
"Reorganisatie mobilisabel personeel Korps Mariniers" d.d. 13
februari 1981, 4, Bijlagen 1 en 3. Anonymus,
Mariniers
van vandaag, 13-17. Teitler en
Homan, Het
Korps Mariniers, 48-56. Hakkert, Het
Korps Mariniers, 464-467. Unless noted
otherwise, all
unit strengths have been derived from tables of organisation
(bemanningslijsten, BL) and drafts of field manuals
(verzamelingen
verordeningen voor de Koninklijke Marine, VVKM) residing in
the
National Archives (Nationaal Archief) in
Den Haag, as follows: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nrs. 6095 (BL
Hoofdkwartier Korps Mariniers 1982-1983), 2498
(VVKM De amfibische sectie 1979), 6085 (BL Amfibische Sectie
1982-1983), 6080 (BL Whiskey
Infanteriecompagnie 1982-1983), 2506
(VVKM De amfibische gevechtsgroep 1982), 6081 (BL Eerste Amfibische
Gevechtsgroep 1982-1983), 6094 (BL Tweede Amfibische Gevechtsgroep
1982-1983), 6099 (BL Derde Amfibische Gevechtsgroep 1982-1983), 5960
(BL Eerste Logistieke Ondersteuningsgroep 1982), 6089 (BL Tweede
Logistieke Ondersteuningsgroep 1982-1983), 5963
(BL Compagniesbootgroep 1982), 5961 (BL
Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Korps Mariniers/Afdeling Marinepatrouilles
Nederland 1982), 5961 (BL
Marinepatrouillecompagnie 1982-1983), 6090
(BL Van Ghent Kazerne 1982-1983), 6098 (BL Van Braam
Houckgeestkazerne 1982-1983), 6091 (BL Amfibisch
Oefenkamp [Joost Dourlein
Kazerne] 1982-1983), 6104 (BL
Marinierskazerne Savaneta
1982-1983), 6087 (BL
Detachement Mariniers
Marinekazerne Amsterdam 1982-1983), 6066
(BL Detachement
Mariniers Marinekazerne Den Haag 1982-1983), 6086
(BL Detachement
Mariniers Marinekazerne Vlissingen 1982-1983), 6096
(BL Detachement
Mariniers Den Helder/Afdeling Willemsoord 1982-1983), 6088
(BL Detachement
Mariniers Marinevliegkamp Valkenburg), 6097 (BL
Detachement Mariniers Den
Helder/Afdeling De Kooy 1982), 6103 (BL
Detachement Suffisant
1982-1983), 6071 (BL
Marinebasis Parera 1982-1983), 192
(Administratieve organisatie Marinierskapel 1945-1981), 5958 (BL
Tamboers en Pijpers 1982), 5975
(BL Bewakingsdetachement
A 1982-1983), 5976 (BL Bewakingsdetachement
B 1982-1983), 5909
(BLen Bewakingsdetachementen
Nederlandse Antillen 1981, 1983); NL-HaNA
2.13.112 inv. nrs. 144 (BL Tweede
Amfibische Gevechtsgroep 1980-1983), 145
(BL Derde
Amfibische Gevechtsgroep 1982-1983). The locations of mobilisation
centres were taken from NL-HaNA 2.12.56 inv. nr. 1876, VVKM 38.1
Mobilisatievoorschrift der Koninklijke Marine, deel 1: Personeel,
Bijlage 5 d.d. 26 oktober 1983. It will be observed that
all tables of organisation date from 1982-1983 (most of these
coming into effect per 1 January 1983), which means that unit strengths
may not be completely accurate for 1985. It
should also be
noted that the personnel strengths given in Part II
in some cases include units or parts of units already listed in Part I. The
aforementioned tables of organisation, called
"bemanningslijsten"
(crew lists) throughout the Royal Navy,
are fairly complicated
documents, and units
or parts of units often appear on more than one crew list. The Marine
Corps Special Assistance
Unit / Shore Patrol Division Netherlands (BBE/MP) for instance appears
on both the peacetime and wartime crew lists of Van Braam Houckgeest
Barracks and Marine Detachment Den Helder, Division
Willemsoord, as well as on their own peacetime and
wartime crew lists. 1 Amphibious Combat Group on the other
hand
does not appear on the crew lists of their barracks, neither peace or
wartime, and the same goes for Whiskey Infantry Company and the Marine
Band of the Royal Navy. The
wartime crew list of Marine Barracks Savaneta, as another
example, includes part of 3 Amphibious Combat Group
(mobilisable),
but this personnel is not counted in the wartime strength of
those
barracks. All this means that separating unit strengths from barrack
strengths
to draw up accurate total strengths would be an extremely
labourious task,
boiling down to counting heads, which I decided to decline
respectfully.
Additional sources are referenced below. |
2. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 2498,
VVKM 412 Voorschrift betreffende de organisatie,
de uitrusting en de tactiek van de amfibische sectie
d.d. 18
oktober 1979, 1-1 t/m 1-2. Ibid., inv. nr. 5961, BL 4230 - BBE/MP d.d.
3
november 1982, 9. Van Dijk en Klein Essink, De mariniers,
193-194. Hakkert, op. cit., 466.
193-194. See also Teitler
en Homan, op. cit., 53. |
3. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 338,
Affiliation of W Company RNLMC to 45 Commando Group d.d. 4 July 1973.
Ibid., Directive to the commanding officer 45 Commando Group defining
his responsibilities to W Company Royal Netherlands Marine Corps d.d. 5
June 1974. Beaver, Today's Royal Marines,
55. Teitler en Homan, op.
cit., 51-52. Hakkert, op. cit., 465. Citation:
Isby and Kamps, Armies,
344. 45 Commando RM further included X-Ray, Yankee and Zulu rifle
companies, hence the name Whiskey Infantry Company. Beaver, loc.
cit. From 1972 to 1990 Whiskey Infantry Company was at the forefront
of Anglo-Dutch marine integration; on 7 June 1990 the company
was
disbanded. Its personnel was reassigned to other units within the
Corps, predominantly to 23 Infantry Company, 2 Amphibious Combat Group.
Haring, Mariniers 325
jaar, 33. Wesselingh en Van Willigenburg, Whiskey Compagnie,
5, 68, 105. |
4. |
|
UK/NL
LF role: Haring, op. cit., 31. Teitler en
Homan, op. cit., 48. Hakkert, loc. cit. Mountain
and arctic warfare training: four to five weeks of mountain warfare
training in the United Kingdom, followed by eight to ten weeks
of arctic warfare training in northern Norway in the period
January-March. This was rounded off with a tactical exercise in Norway,
once per two years with the United Kingdom Amphibious Force
(UK/NL AF). Van
Dijk en Klein Essink, op. cit., 113, 117-119. Haring,
op. cit., 35, 58-59, 83. Teitler en Homan,
op. cit., 45-46. Wesselingh en Van
Willigenburg, op. cit., 60-61. Hakkert, loc. cit. Elements attached:
NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6081, BL 4301 - 1AGGP d.d. 23
maart 1983, 54. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit.,
74. Formation fourth rifle company: NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 6081, op.
cit., 40-47, 54. |
5. |
|
Regarding
the unit strengths of 1
and 2 Amphibious Combat Group some remarks are necessary. A document on
2 Amphibious Combat group from July 1984 shows that by that time total
wartime strength had risen to 821 men, which is why that
number is
added between {braces} for both units, which had identical
organisations. Undated handwritten corrections in regulations
from
1982 present in the library of the Marine Museum in
Rotterdam
(Mariniersmuseum, MM) indicate a rise to a total peacetime
strength of 711 men for 1 Amphibious Combat Group and
a wartime
strength of 827 men for both 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group. All
increases took place in the staff and support company. Peacetime
locations, personnel strengths and
internal rationalisations of 2 Amphibious Combat Group in 1984: NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv.
nr. 772, Reorganisatie opleidingen en 2AGGP d.d. 2 juli 1984. Amphibious
Combat Group unit strengths with undated corrections: MM, inv.nr.
60172, VVKM 407 Voorschrift betreffende de Amfibische Gevechtsgroep
d.d. 23 november 1982, 1-1 t/m 1-3. It
should be
noted that the specified peacetime strength of 2 Amphibious Combat
Group is given as officers/sub-officers/corporals and soldiers, so
corporals are not counted as sub-officers here, even though in the
Royal Navy they had this status (unlike in the Royal Army);
Royal
Navy documents are regrettably inconsistent in this respect. It should
also be noted that this peacetime strength is somewhat doubtful; it
comes from a 1981 document on mobilisable marine units, which on
another page suggests, after some necessary calculations, a peacetime
strength of 23/34/437 (494). NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 4, 10. Regarding
the internal
rationalisations to increase 2 Amphibious Combat Group's operational
readiness: these included
optimising training programmes, relocating subunits based in the
Netherlands and improving the effectiveness of its command and
logistic support structure. It is remarkable that these improvements,
which were budget-neutral, were not initiated by the Marine Corps but
resulted from criticisms in the 1983 annual report of the
Court of
Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer). HTK
1983-1984, kamerstuknr. 18313 ondernr. 2,
108-110. |
6. |
|
Peacetime
authority and
Netherlands Antilles / NATO roles: NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv.
nr. 535, op. cit., 32-34,72-73. Hakkert, op. cit.,
464, 465-466. See also Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 53. Elements attached:
NL-HaNA 2.13.112, inv. nr. 144, BL 4310 - 2AGGP d.d. 22
augustus 1983, voetnoten. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit.,
74. On 1 December
1989 2 Amphibious Combat Group became part of ACE Mobile Force (Land). Haring, op.
cit., 37-38. Jungle
warfare training was carried out
piecemeal, by detachments of ± 30 men or less, and
was introductory only. The training, which
was perhaps held four times a year, was given by
personnel of the French Foreign Legion and apparently lasted
between one and two weeks. It was
observed that there were remarkable similarities with the first stage
of arctic warfare training. NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 773, Informatiebulletin Commandant Korps Mariniers
d.d. 22 november 1982, 17. Qua
Patet Orbis nr. 110 (november 1982), 47-50. Qua Patet Orbis nr.
111 (februari 1983), 59-60. See also Haring, op. cit.,
159-161. |
7. |
|
Role:
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit.,
35,73. Hakkert, op. cit.,
466. See also Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 53. Haring, op. cit., 34,
reports that 3 Amphibious Combat Group would become available
to
SACLANT after mobilisation; it
should be noted however that this pertains to the situation in
1990. Refresher training: NL-HaNA 2.13.141,
inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 19. Hakkert, op. cit.,
464, 466. There is uncertainty about the location of
the mobilisation centre(s) for 3 Amphibious Combat Group:
tables of organisation (bemanningslijsten, BL) from November 1982 and
January 1983 indicate Van Ghent Barracks in Rotterdam and Van Braam
Houckgeest Barracks in Doorn respectively; the one from August 1983
does not indicate any location. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6099
(Bemanningslijsten 3 Amfibische Gevechtgroep, 1982-1983). |
8. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op cit.,
8, 10. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit.,
74. It
is not unambiguously clear under whose operational command
these
units would fall; probably they would, at least initially, be attached
to 1 and 2 Amphibious Combat Group respectively. See Unit
Organisation and Equipment, 1 Amphibious Combat Group, footnote
3. |
9. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 5963, BL 4325 - CIEBOOTGP d.d. 17 november 1982. Anonymus,
op. cit., 15. Haring, op. cit., 31.
Hakkert, loc. cit.,
466. See also Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 53-54. |
10. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 5961, BL 4230 - BBE/MP d.d.
3
november 1982. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 73-74. Teitler
en Homan, op. cit., 54, 57-58, 63-66. Van Dijk en Klein Essink, op.
cit., 174. See also Hakkert, op. cit.,
466. Possible
wartime deployment: NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv.
nr. 923,
Verbindingsmateriaal BBE MARNS/MP in Nederland d.d. 25 oktober
1979. Ibid., inv. nr. 986, Operatiebevel
CKMARNS 1/83 d.d. 14 februari 1983, 1, 2. The
two other Special Assistance Units were sniper/precision
shooter units
(langeafstandsschutters / precisieschutters): the Armed Forces Special
Assistance Unit (Bijzondere
Bijstandseenheid Krijgsmacht, BBE-K) and the State Police Special
Assistance Unit
(Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid Rijkspolitie, BBE-RP). HTK 2014-2015,
kamerstuknr. 34000 VI ondernr. 19, Bijlage 2014D42636
(Onderzoeksrapport De Punt 1977),
41-42. See also Van der Spek, Een
wapen,
10, 13, 59; Teitler en Homan, op. cit., 57. Reasons
to
base the Reserve Platoon BBE-M/2nd MP Platoon at Den Helder:
NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 923, Reorganisatie BBE-MARNS d.d. 26 april
1978. Until 1979-1980 BBE-M was composed of personnel of 11
Infantry Company, 1 Amphibious Combat Group. The subsequent
integration
of the counterterrorism and navy policing roles in the
permanent
BBE/MP
unit, effective per 1 September 1980, and the somewhat isolated
location of the Reserve Platoon were, at least initially, not without
problems: negative effects on training, readiness and unit
cohesion were observed. Ibid. NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 923, Reorganisatie
BBE-MARNS d.d. 1 november 1979. Ibid.,
inv.
nr. 637,
Reorganisatie BBE/MP d.d. 15 januari 1980. Ibid., Reorganisatie BBE/MP
d.d. 10 juni 1980. Ibid., Accomodatie 2e Peloton BBE/MP te
Den Helder d.d. 7 november 1980. See also NL-HaNA 2.12.56,
inv.
nr. 8567, Reorganisatie BBE/MP per 011079 d.d. 19 september 1979.
Ibid., Reorganisatie BBE/MP d.d. 7 mei 1980. In later years the
messenger services, part of their MP duties (see footnote 12), were
reassigned to the Naval Security Guard Corps
(Marinebewakingskorps,
MBK). Jensen en Platje, De
MARID, 151. Attachment from the
Amphibious Section: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5961, op. cit.,
9. Direct
action operations:
"Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by
special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or
inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel." US
Department of Defense Dictionary, 130. The
aforementioned 2014 report (HTK 2014-2015, op. cit.)
not only provides a detailed reconstruction of the 1977 operation
against the hijacked train near De Punt (Hoofdstuk 4), but also
describes the command structure in which the Special
Assistance Units operated (33-38) and outlines the history of the
formation of these units in the early 1970s (39-42). An animated
reconstruction of the operation, released with the report, can be
viewed here. |
11. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., Bijlage 1, 5. |
12. |
|
Shore
Patrol units (Marinepatrouilles, MP) formed the Royal Navy's
internal
policing force, comparable to Shore Patrol (SP) units in the
US and Royal (UK) Navies. Their duties involved
supervising the
conduct and dress of navy personnel on
shore, investigating unauthorised absence
of personnel, operating a messenger service for collecting and
delivering classified mail, and performing ceremonial duties.
Shore Patrol had
no legal competence; suspects of disciplinary
or criminal offenses would be
handed over to the Royal
Military Constabulary or the regular (civil) police.
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 8567, Circulaire voor de
zeemacht D64 Voorschrift betreffende de Bijzondere
Bijstandseenheid van het Korps Mariniers - Marinepatrouille in
Nederland (BBE-MP) d.d. 6 oktober 1983. |
13. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 772, op. cit. Hakkert, op. cit.,
465-466. Marine Corps military education and training programmes
are described in some detail in ibid.,
467-470, and more extensively in Teitler en Homan, op. cit.,
39-47. |
14. |
|
Hakkert, op. cit.,
466. Anonymus, op. cit., 17. Name change: Jaarboek KM 1983, 392. |
15. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., Hoofdstuk III. |
16. |
|
NL-HANA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 192, Taakomschrijving Marinierskapel
en Tamboers en Pijpers d.d. 21 augustus 1981, Bijlage 1 en
2. Teitler
en Homan, op, cit., 56. Hakkert, op. cit.,
467. Marine Band unit strength: NL-HANA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 192, Voorstel
administratieve organisatie Marinierskapel der Koninklijke Marine d.d.
3 juni 1980, 2. Wartime NBC reconnaissance role: in
NL-HaNA I have only found tables of organisation for Security
Detachments A and B, each with two Marine Band members forming
an
NBC
reconnaissance team as part of the detachment's staff section. If the
other security detachments were identical in this respect then
the
majority of Marine Band personnel would have served in this
role
in
wartime. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5975, BL
4410 - BEWDET
A d.d. 1 juni 1983. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 5976, BL 4411 -
BEWDET B
d.d. 1 juni 1983. See also Anonymus,
op. cit., 16.
|
17. |
|
Ibid.
Unit strength: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr.
5975, op. cit. Ibid., inv. nr. 5976, op. cit. Mobilisation
locations: ibid., inv. nr. 1876, loc. cit. Unit strength and role:
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv.
nr. 796, op. cit., 16, Bijlage 1, 5; Bijlage 3, 1. Royal Army
Colonel G.J. Felius (Rtd.), when
assigned
to the staff of National
Territorial Command from 1977 to 1980, noticed
that the Royal Navy
had "a large number of mobilisable marine
battalions", "far more than necessary to secure their objects". Felius,
Einde
Oefening, 207. Felius,
email 29.12.2007. I have found no record of such units for the
mid-1980s; it may be that the security detachments were (or
had
earlier been) grouped into battalions for administrative or logistical
reasons, for instance per location or operational area. |
18. |
|
Jaarboek
KM 1985, 53. |
19. |
|
Isby
and Kamps, op. cit., 343. |
20. |
|
Armed
men rather than manned arms: Hakkert, op. cit.,
467. Not an elite force: see for example Van
Dijk en Klein Essink, op. cit., 19-20 and Haring, op.
cit., 23. |
21. |
|
Peacetime
strength: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 6149, Verhoging
korpssterkte/arbeidsduurverkorting d.d. 3 januari 1985.
Professional/conscript ratio: Hakkert, op. cit.,
464. Selection
data for 1989: Haring, op. cit., 18. Conscript
service duration: Hakkert, loc. cit. |
22. |
|
NATO
readiness category for 1 Amphibious Combat Group: NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 7; for 2 Amphibious Combat Group:
ibid., 9 and NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 772, op. cit., Toekomstige rol
2AGGP d.d. 16 februari 1984, 1 t/m 2. NATO Maritime
Forces Readiness Standards (MARFORSTANS ) are described in more detail
in NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 43-44. |
23. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 338, Draft
Joint Marine Sub-Committee Background, 4 May 1973. Ibid., Memorandum
of Understanding between the Netherlands Ministry of
Defence
and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 9 May 1973.
Beaver,
op. cit., 28-29. Haring, op. cit., 56, 58. Teitler en Homan, op. cit.,
48. |
24. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 495, Verslag oefening "Blauwe baret" 1982. Ibid.,
inv. nr. 772, loc. cit. Ibid., inv. nr. 987, Voorstel wijziging
BDZ-OPORD 9 d.d. 9 september 1982. NL-HaNA 2.13.182, inv. nr. 366, op.
cit., Deel 1, Hoofdstuk III. Ibid., inv. nr. 535, op. cit., Deel 1,
Hoofdstuk III t/m VII. Teitler
en Homan, op. cit., 48 t/m 56. Hakkert,
op. cit., 464 t/m 467.
Lund, Don't
Rock the Boat,
61-64. |
25. |
|
Regarding
military assistance in the Netherlands (national
role), formation of General Military Assistance Units would
only
be possible if the operational combat unit(s) needed were not deployed
elsewhere (e.g. winter training). NL-HaNA 2.13.141, inv. nr. 987, op.
cit. It would seem that the same
provision would also influence the minimum formation time of QPO units
(United Nations role). No General Military
Assistance Units or QPO units were ever deployed. |
26. |
|
3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM: SOHB
1985, 12. Beaver, op. cit., 40-46, 51-55, 64-71, 79-82. Isby
and Kamps, op.
cit., 255-256. 40 (UK) Commando RM,
normally part of the brigade, would
likely not deploy to north Norway as it was not trained in
mountain and arctic
warfare. SOHB 1985, loc. cit. Beaver, op. cit., 51-55. The
(UK) Special Boat Section
(SBS) is usually not shown as part of 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM or UK/NL LF,
but its role in this force can be gathered from, for instance, Beaver,
op cit., 80; also Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 255, lists SBS as part of 3
(UK) Cdo Bde RM. Marine Corps units
integrated in UK/NL LF: NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 84, 72. As
noted before, it
is not clear whether 1 Logistic Support Group would
remain under command
of 1 Amphibious
Combat Group;
it seems likely that the unit would, at least to some
degree, be integrated into
(UK) Commando Logistic Regiment during operations. See Unit
Organisation and Equipment, 1 Amphibious Combat Group, footnote
3. |
27. |
|
This
task organisation appears to indicate
a spearhead
role, or a more or less separate deployment for this unit.
It may
however simply be the consequence of the fact that 45 (UK) Cdo Gp RM
was based
in Arbroath, Scotland whilst the rest of 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM was based
in Plymouth, England. Isby and Kamps, op. cit., 255-256. Website British
Army units from 1945 on. For
what it is worth, an official RM document from 1976 describes
3 (UK)
Cdo Bde RM as comprising "three commando groups" rather than three
commandos, which suggests that the formation of such groups was not
unique to 45 (UK) Cdo RM. NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 2467, Concept of
Operations for the Amphibious Landing Force in the 1980s/1990s d.d. 12
October 1976, 1. |
28. |
|
From 1986 Blowpipe
was replaced by the Javelin portable air defence system.
Beaver, op. cit., 46, 103. In 1985 the air defence troop of 3 (UK) Cdo
Bde RM had twelve air defence systems, probably 4 x for each RM
commando. The anti-aircraft section of 1 Amphibious Combat
Group operating directly under brigade command: at least this was the
case in 1991. Van Egmond, 15e
Ondersteuningscompagnie, 13. |
29. |
|
SOHB 1985, 39. Beaver, op.
cit., passim. For 3 (UK) Cdo Bde RM, SOHB
1985 reports 311 officers and 4904 men (war establishment), including
40 Cdo RM; and 1,010 wheeled vehicles and 623
trailers. Here these numbers have been
cross-referenced with
personnel strengths and
vehicle numbers of 1 Amphibious Combat Group
and Whiskey Infantry Company. The Dutch
Bv 202 over-snow vehicles were stockpiled at Kilbotn, the
British probably at Bjerkvik. NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 341, Opslag
sneeuwvoertuigen van het Korps Mariniers te Noorwegen d.d. 21 januari
1980 (Dutch). Ibid.,
Minutes of the fifteenth meeting of the Joint
Marine Corps Sub-Committee d.d. 18 December 1979, 13 (British). |
30. |
|
UK/NL
Landing Force/Amphibious Force: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 2467, op.
cit., 1, 4. See also Haring, op. cit., 29. Royal Navy
commitments for MARCONFORPLANS involving amphibious support: NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 84. See also Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships,
348. Royal (UK) Navy ships
available for UK/NL AMF: Hekman, Amfibische
strijdkrachten, 2318. |
31. |
|
Scarcity
of amphibious lift and the need to employ STUFT: NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 337, 14e Meeting of the joint marine corps
sub-committee d.d. 25 oktober 1978 (letter from Commander, Marine Corps
dated 29 maart 1979). Ibid.,
inv. nr. 338, Memorandum of Understanding
between the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence, 9 May 1973, 1. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit., 73. See also
Hekman, op. cit.,
Discussie
and Lund, op. cit.,
62. Available Royal (UK) Navy amphibious shipping: Hekman,
op. cit., 2318. Envisioned role of
HMS Illustrious or HMS
Invincible in UK/NL AMF: Beaver, op. cit., 85. Regarding
Royal Navy plans to requisition civilian shipping NL-HaNA 2.13.182,
inv. nr. 535, loc. cit. somewhat cryptically states that there were
plans to provide for "part of" the necessary lift
capacity. The
Marine Corps would only
get
its own amphibious lift well after the end of the Cold War,
with
the commissioning of Landing Platform Dock Hr. Ms. Rotterdam in
1998. |
32. |
|
Van
Dijk en Klein Essink, op. cit., 200. Haring,
op. cit., 37. The movement of Marine Corps units to the United Kingdom
was a Netherlands responsibility. See footnote 23, Memorandum of
Understanding. See also website
Marineschepen, Zr.Ms. Rotterdam LPD, Het Korps Mariniers vecht voor een eigen
schip. Concentration predominantly
in the Plymouth area: in 1973 it was agreed that Whiskey Infantry Company
would concentrate with 45 (UK) Commando Group RM in Arbroath. NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 338, Draft
Joint Marine Sub-Committee Background, 4 May 1973, 10. It
seems likely that this remained so through the 1980s. See also footnote
27. |
33. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 3413, Rationalisation of RNLMC WMR storage in UK d.d.
11 november 1980. Ibid., WMR mariniers d.d. 27 mei 1981. |
34. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.12.56, inv. nr. 2467, op. cit., 11. Beaver,
op. cit., 31. Beaver notes that although
STUFT could be
used in a "limited, undeclared war" such as the Falklands campaign
(1982), "such ships could not be expected to be used in a 'hot' war
against the current NATO potential enemy of the Warsaw Pact." Beaver,
op. cit., 85. Another
disadvantage of STUFT was that these required
harbours, which could easily be blocked even in peacetime. Hekman, op. cit.,
Discussie,
2320. Concerns about UK/NL AMF's assault capacity being compromised by
shortfall in amphibious shipping are expressed in Lamers, De
militaire situatie, 2497-2498. On a similar
note, the chairman of the Joint
Marine Corps Sub-Committee in 1979 observed that "a fine, well
equipped landing force would be rendered ineffective if it were not to
have the amphibious shipping to deploy it in war or to exercise it in
peace." NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 341, Minutes of the fifteenth meeting of the Joint
Marine Corps Sub-Committee d.d. 18 December 1979, 4.
Estimated time to
deploy to northern Norway: NL-HaNA 2.12.56, inv. nr. 2467, op. cit., 7.
Johnson, The
Impact, 55. Lund,
op. cit.,
62. Vaessen, De
vreemdste grens, 343. |
35. |
|
Hekman, op. cit., 2317. For the importance
of the northern flank to NATO in wartime, see also Martin, Before the Day After,
31-33; Lamers, op. cit.; Lund,
op. cit.,
1-3; Pruijs, De
verdediging. |
36. |
|
Quoted from the minutes of the
fifteenth meeting of the Joint
Marine Corps Sub-Committee, see footnote 34. |
37. |
|
Beaver, op. cit., 30-31.
Haring, op. cit., 34. NL-HaNA
2.13.182, inv. nr. 535, op. cit.,
mentions two
SACEUR contingency plans concerning NATO's southern flank: SACEUR OPLAN
10710 "SACEUR's contingency operation plan for maritime contingency
force amphibious operations in the southern region (Flaming
Henna)" and SACEUR OPLAN 10730 "SACEUR’s contingency operation
plan for employment of amphibious force in the southern region of ACE".
The outline descriptions only include the deployment of
US
Marine Corps forces and local (i.e. Italian, Greek, Turkish) NATO
forces. |
38. |
|
NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit. |
39. |
|
The
attentive reader will note that these numbers do not add up to 6,700:
968 + 3028 + 2816 = 6812, which leaves a negative
discrepancy of 112 men. Assuming that the numbers needed to
bring
units up to war strength are correct, there is probably an error in the
number of 'surplus' reservists. The number of men "neither
needed
nor assigned" may therefor be read as 102/-/2617 (2,719).
This still leaves a shortage of 15 men, but one may also note that
there was apparently a shortage of 15 sub-officers. The study does, as
it happens, show another negative discrepancy, of 6 men (sub "Marinier
verbindingen"), which I have assumed to be 3 sub-officers and 3
enlisted. NL-HaNA
2.13.141, inv. nr. 796, op. cit., 4. |
40. |
|
Whilst
I have not found an official rejection of the plan, I have
not found
any indication that it, or elements of it, were ever realised. |
41. |
|
Website
International Institute of Social History, Value
of the Guilder/Euro, calculated 28.03.2016. |
|